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  China is now the largest recipient of foreign direct investment among emerging 
markets and a major home country for FDIs. In less than 40 years since it began 
its modernization process in the late 1970s, the country has entered into more 
than 120 bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and free trade agreements (FTA). With 
the status change from a pure capital importing country to a country of both 
importing and exporting capital, China’s policy toward foreign investment has 
evolved from emphasizing the rights of home States to focusing on protection of 
investors and investments. An example in this regard is investor-state arbitration 
which was strongly resisted by China but now a common feature in all BITs and 
FTAs to which China is a party. This article first examines China’s practice 
toward foreign investment over the last three decades and more, analyzing China’s 
policy reflection on treaties and laws. The mechanisms that China has established 
in respect of foreign investment are discussed. Thereafter, detailed comparison and 
discussions are made between China’s treaty practice and international investment 
arbitration to illustrate in what way and to what extent China’s practice is in 
compliance with contemporary investment arbitration practice. Issues analyzed 
include, qualified investors and investments, fair and equitable treatment, minimum 
standard of treatment, full protection and security, most-favoured-nation treatment, 
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national treatment, expropriation and compensation, and mechanisms relating to 
dispute resolution. 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, international investment, fair and equitable 
treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, national treatment, expropriation, 
compensation, dispute resolution, investor-state arbitration and China 
investment law
China started its long march for modernization in 1978 by encouraging the 
inflow of foreign capital and technology and reforming the domestic economy.1) 
In a short span of 30 years, it is now the most active and largest developing host 
country for foreign direct investment,2) which has been resulted from its economic 
reforms and opening to the outside world in the last three decades, Over the last 
30 years,
 
China entered into more than 120 bilateral investment treaties (BIT)3) 
and several Free Trade Agreements. In April 2008, had China not only enter into 
a Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) with New Zealand which marked the first FTA 
that it has signed with a developed country,4) but also started negotiations on BIT 
1) After the death of late Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came into 
power. The Chinese Communist Party held its 3
rd
 Plenary Session of the 11
th
 Central 
Committee meeting which declared that the country would end the notorious Cultural 
Revolution and abandon large scale political movement. It also announced that the 
country would embark on domestic economic reforms and open to the outside world.  
For more detailed discussions, see Guiguo Wang, Wang’s Business Law of China (4th 
Ed), LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003, Chapter 2.
2) According to the statistics issued by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic 
of China, China absorbed US$747.1 billion foreign investment by the end of 2007. 
See http://www.fdi.com.cn/pub/FDI_EN/News/Focus/Subject/Utilization2007/default.html. According 
to 2007 World Investment Report of UNCTAD, China ranked No.5 globally and No.1 
among developing countries in direct foreign investment inflow. It continued to be 
regarded as the most attractive host country and first R&D choice worldwide. For details, 
see http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1465. 
3) See UNCTAD, “Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements:2007-June 
2008”, p. 3, figure 2, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20081_en.pdf.
4) China and New Zealand started to carry out a feasibility study for concluding a FTA. 
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with the United States–its most important trading partner.5) As China is now one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world,6) it has also re-negotiated its BITs 
with other countries, which demonstrates the country’s willingness to accept the 
modern standards of treatment to foreign investments. 
As the second-largest FDI recipient (after the United States), attracting around 
US$ 95 billion in 2009, according to the World Investment Report 2010,7) China 
is almost immune from investor-state arbitration, either as investor or host state.8) 
The two countries signed a FTA on April 7, 2008. By 2008, China was the fourth 
largest trading partner of New Zealand, importing over $1.6 billion of New Zealand’s 
merchandise and over $1 billion of services per annum. It was also anticipated that 
China’s middle class which was estimated to be more than 100 million people would 
also increase the import by China of New Zealand’s agricultural products. For details, 
see http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Agreements/China/index.php.
5) The United States announced that after 17 month preliminary negotiations with China, 
both countries had agreed to start negotiations for a bilateral investment treaty 
(“BIT”) on June 20, 2008. Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs of the 
Department of State announced that the negotiations would cover the following 
aspects: (1) non-discriminatory treatment; (2) fair and equitable treatment, including 
the right to due process; (3) compensation in the event of expropriation or 
nationalization; (4) free transfers of capital; (5) transparent regulation; and (6) 
submitting disputes to independent international arbitration. It also considered that the 
BIT would, if successfully negotiated and entered into, “require China to abide by 
clear, certain and agreed rules on investor protection and transparency of investment- 
related laws and regulations”. See http://www. state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2008/106132.htm.
6) The average annul GDP growth rate of the Asia and Pacific region during the period 
of 1990 to 2006 was 5.7% which was the highest compared to other regions of the 
world. Within the Asia-Pacific region, China has been in leading position in economic 
development. Its average annual GDP growth rate between 1990 to 2006 was 10.2%. 
See UNESCAP, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2007, available at 
www.unescap.org/stat/data/syb2007/ESCAP-SYB2007.pdf.
7) See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low Carbon Economy, 
p. 4; available at: <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010ch1_en.pdf>.
8) Regarding investor-State disputes under China-related BITs, Tza Yap Shum v. Peru is 
the only case. See Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
registered 12 February 2007, award issued 7 July 2011 (not yet published). On 24 May 
2011, a Malaysian company filed the first-ever case against the Chinese government 
before ICSID, but that case was “suspended” on 12 July 2011 “pursuant to the 
parties’ agreement”. See Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/15; status available via the ICSID website at: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
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The above having been said, recent Chinese practice will have important consequences 
on its laws and legal systems. Recognition of investment interests of legal persons 
established by nationals of a BIT contracting party in a third country is an example. 
In the past, China refused to protect such investment; yet the China-Argentina 
BIT (1992) and China-Brunei BIT (2000) offer protections to such investment.9) 
China is an important recipient of FDI, at the same time its role as a capital 
exporting country is also growing.10) Any policy taken by China through signing 
BIT or FTA will have an international implication.
I. Mechanisms for Protecting Foreign Investment
For the purpose of attracting foreign investment, China adopted the Chinese- 
Foreign Joint Venture Law in 1979.11) Almost 10 years later, the Chinese-Foreign 
Cooperative Venture Law12) was enacted to be followed by the Wholly Foreign-owned 
Enterprise Law.13) 
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=ViewAllCases#. 
9) Article 2 of the 1992 China-Argentina BIT reads “If natural or judicial persons of a 
Contracting Party have an interest in a judicial person which was established within 
the territory of a third State, and this judicial person invests in the Other Contracting 
Party, it shall be recognized as a judicial person of the former Contracting Party.”
10) For instance, 1067 medium- and large-sized Chinese enterprises made investment 
overseas in 2005, the agreed investment value of the Chinese parties amounted to 
US$6.954bln. See http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestment/html.
11) Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures adopted 
on July 1, 1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, and 
amended by the 4
th
 Session of the Standing Committee of the 9
th
 National People’s 
Congress on March 15, 2000 (hereinafter “Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law”).
12) Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 
adopted at the First Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress and promulgated 
by Order No. 4 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on April 13, 1988, 
and effective as of the date of promulgation.
13) Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises adopted 
on April 12, 1986 by the 4th Session of the 6th National People’s Congress and 
amended on October 31, 2000 by the Standing Committee of the 18th Session of the 
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These three laws dictated the forms of foreign investment in China.14) In general, 
there was no upper limit for foreign equity holding. Yet it is stipulated that 
foreign investors’ ownership must not be less than 25% of the total investment.15) 
As to the sectors for investment, there have always been restrictions.16) After 
China joined the WTO, some service sectors are open to foreign investors.17)  
A very important issue in China’s effort to attract foreign investment was 
treatment of foreign investors, in particular, whether foreign investment might be 
expropriated and if so, whether compensation would be paid and the standard for 
assessing foreign investment assets.18) These questions arose because the Chinese 
government nationalized foreign and Chinese private concerns after its establishment 
9th National People’s Congress.
14) According to the statistics issued by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic 
of China, by the end of 2005, more than 630,000 FDIs had been established. See: 
http://www.fdi.com.cn/pub/FDI_EN/News/Focus/Subject/Utilization2007/default.html. All these 
enterprises were established in accordance with the Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture 
Law, Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Venture Law and Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises. 
In practice, many Chinese entities still prefer equity joint ventures when cooperating 
with foreign counterparts.
15) Article 4 of the Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law provides : “The proportion of the 
foreign party’s contribution to the registered capital of an equity joint venture shall in 
general not be less than 25 percent.”
16) The control exercised by the Chinese government is through approval process of the 
equity ventures. According to Article 3 of the Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law, the 
agreement, contract and articles of association of an equity joint venture signed by 
the Chinese and foreign parties must be submitted to the state department in charge 
“for examination and approval.” The Chinese government also publishes foreign investment 
guidelines stipulating the areas that are restricted from and those are encouraged to 
attract foreign investments. For details, see www.mofcom.gov.cn.
17) For details, see Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China and 
Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China adopted 
at the Doha Ministerial Conference on November 10,2001 (WT/ACC/CHN/49). For 
discussion on the matter, see Guiguo Wang, The Law of the WTO China and the 
Future of Free Trade, Sweet & Maxwell, Asia, 2005.
18) These are still paramount issues for foreign investors although the form and scale of 
expropriation have changed over time. Open nationalization or expropriation is no longer 
the issue but regulatory taking has become a concern of the contemporary world. 
This is evidenced in the ICSID arbitration relating to Argentina, Mexico, etc. 
192   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제4호 (2012. 12.)
in 1949.19) Also since China assumed the seat at the United Nations, it had 
always followed the policies of developing countries in respect of south-south and 
north-south issues.20) 
At first, the Chinese government tried to ease the concern of foreign investors 
over expropriation through domestic laws.21) For instance, Article 2 of the 
Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law provides: “The State shall not nationalize or 
requisition any joint ventures. Under special circumstances, in the interest of the 
public, the State may requisition a joint venture in accordance with legal procedures 
and appropriate compensation shall be made.”22) It should be pointed out however 
19) After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China expropriated all the 
private enterprises, which process was essentially completed by 1957 when the 
country started the Anti-Rightists Movement. For discussion on China’s political and 
economic situation in particular expropriation, see George N. Ecklund, “Protracted 
Expropriation of Private Business in Communist China”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3 
(Autumn, 1963), pp. 238-249.
20) At the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, Deng Xiaoping, 
then Vice Premier of China expounded the theory of three worlds and stressed the 
need for establishing a new international economic order. Soon after assuming its seat 
in the UN, China joined the Group of 77 known as “the G77 plus China”. China 
shared views of developing countries in and contributed to the adoption of the 1974 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the 1990 Declaration on International 
Economic Co-operation, in particular the Revitalization of Economic Growth and 
Development of the Developing Countries, etc. For more on China’s role these issues, 
see http://www.showchina.org/zgygjzzxl/zgylhg/04/200701/t107115.htm.
21) Some scholars argued that the concern about macro political risks such as 
expropriation missed the zeitgeist of post-Mao China and that as part of its 
commitment to reform, China had paid less attention to its theoretical right to seize 
foreign assets and the ensuing legal implications than to its ability to attract foreign 
investment. See David L. Weller, “The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal 
Means for Foreign Investors to Challenge Agency Action”, Columbia Law Review. 
Vol. 98, No. 5 (June 1998), p. 1238.
22) At the same time, Article 5 of the Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law states that 
the state shall not nationalize or requisition any foreign-owned enterprises. Under special 
circumstances, however, where public interest requires, foreign-owned enterprises may 
be requisitioned through legal procedures and appropriate compensation shall be made, 
the same Article provides. Article 5 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China on Sino-foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Continental Petroleum Resources 
prescribes that the State shall not expropriate the investments and income of foreign 
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that when China started its policy on domestic reforms and opening to the outside 
world 30 years ago, concerns relating to expropriation of foreign investment were 
quite different from those in the 21
st
 century.23) Even taking that into account, the 
Chinese law provisions could not ease the concern of foreign investors, as at that 
time the rest of the world and China were mutually unknown to each other. For 
instance, expropriation for public purposes had already been commonly accepted 
by Western countries, when the Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law was adopted. 
Yet, Chinese scholars were still debating whether nationalization was an exercise 
of sovereignty and if yes, what should be the standard of compensation.24) Regarding 
the standard for compensation, China took the developing countries’ view, i.e., 
appropriate compensation, which begged more rather than solved questions.25) 
enterprises that participate in the cooperative exploitation of continental petroleum 
resources and that under special circumstances, the State may, according to the needs 
of public interests, expropriate a portion or all of the petroleum due to foreign enterprises 
in connection with their cooperative contracts.
23) Currently the international community pays more and more attention to creeping 
expropriation or indirect expropriation. As a result, changes in exchange rates, repatriation 
policies, adoption and amendment of laws relating to taxes, prices, labor, import and 
export, foreign control of certain types of companies, etc. may all lead to disputes 
involving creeping expropriation. A renegotiated contract may also result in suspension 
of indirect expropriation if the terms thereof become less favorable to the foreign 
investors in question. For discussions on the issues relating to China, see Pat K. 
Chew, “Political Risks and U.S. Investment in China : Chimera of Protection and 
Predictability?” Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 34 (1994), p. 615.  Timothy 
A. Steinert, “If the BIT Fits: The Proposed Bilateral Investment Treaty between the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China, Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 2 
(Fall 1988), p. 451. Even Chinese scholars have admitted that indirect expropriation is 
not an impossibility in China. See Zeng Huaqun, WTO and the Development of 
Foreign Investment Law of China, Xiamen University Press, 2006, p. 290.
24) See Wang Xuan, “Permanent Sovereignty of States toward Natural Resources”, Chinese 
Yearbook of International Law (1982), pp. 99-114; Mei Ruao, “Legal Protection of 
International Investment”, Chinese Yearbook of International Law (1982), pp. 115-144; 
Ni Zhengyu, “Theory and Practice of State Immunity”, Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law (1983), pp. 3-30; and Chen Tiqiang, “State Sovereign Immunity and 
International Law”, Chinese Yearbook of International Law (1983), pp. 31-53.
25) It is interesting to note that in his separate opinion in CME Czech Republic B. V. v. 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL which was issued in 2003, Professor Ian Brownlie suggested, 
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In addition to the issues relating to expropriation, there were other hurdles in 
Chinese law on foreign investment, including Chinese law being the governing 
law on foreign investment contracts,26) although investment disputes among 
contracting parties may be resolved within or outside China.27) No right relating 
to investor-state arbitration was stipulated in Chinese law.28)  
Naturally what the Chinese government did was welcomed by foreign investors 
who at the same time expected China to adopt more measures in protecting their 
interests.29) For instance, the Joint Venture Law only mentioned compensation for 
nationalization but without specifying what were the related rights and interests of 
joint ventures. Also, what forms of investment other than the joint ventures that 
would be considered as foreign direct investment and would therefore be entitled 
to the same treatment in case of nationalization were not stipulated in detail either.30) 
by relying on 1974 UN General Assembly Resolutions, appropriate compensation as 
the standard in assessing Czech Republic’s liability. 
26) Article 2 of the Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law which stipulates that joint venture 
agreements, contracts and articles of association are subject to relevant Chinese laws.
27) Article 15 of the Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law provides that parties to Chinese- 
foreign joint ventures may, by agreement, have their disputes resolved by a Chinese 
arbitration body or another arbitration body, which is interpreted to mean a foreign 
arbitration body, and that where there is no agreement on arbitration, a disputing 
party may bring the case to a Chinese court. In practice, most Chinese-foreign joint 
venture contracts contain provisions for settling disputes by arbitration tribunals within 
China in particular by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.
28) Having recognized the limits of traditional remedies available to foreign investors against 
host countries, such as local court proceedings and diplomatic protection, the World 
Bank started to create a special mechanism for resolving investor-state disputes in 
1961. In 1965, the Executive Directors of the World Bank adopted the text of the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States which entered into force in 1966 after the depositing of 20 ratifications. 
For more on the Convention, see P.F. Sutherland, “The World Bank Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 28, (July 1979), pp. 367-400. 
29) See Stanley Lubman, “Looking for Law in China”, Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, (Fall 2006), pp. 1-92. Jerome Alan Cohen and Stuart J. Valentine, 
“Foreign Direct Investment in the People’s Republic of China: Progress, Problems and 
Proposals”, Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 1, (Fall 1987), pp. 161-200.
30) There are differences under the Chinese Constitution with regard to protection against 
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Unless these questions were answered, the skeleton type Chinese laws mentioned 
above may be of little use to foreign investors.31) The solution of the problem 
rested on the formation of international mechanisms for the protection of foreign 
direct investment in China. 
The first step that China took for creating an international mechanisms in absorbing 
foreign direct investment was conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).32) 
The first group of BITs that China entered into was with Germany (1983),33) 
France (1984)34) and Norway (1984).35) 
All these BITs have a common feature of being brief in nature. For instance, 
the China-Norway BIT has only 9 articles which outlined the desire of both 
parties in promoting bilateral investment and a few concepts such as investment 
expropriation to foreign-owned properties as opposed to domestic-owned private properties. 
See Yasheng Huang, “One Country, Two Systems : Foreign-Invested Enterprises and 
Domestic Firms in China”, China Economic Review, Vol. 14 (2003), pp. 404-416.
31) As a practice in the 1980s and 1990s, where a law was adopted by the National 
People’s Congress, implementation provisions would be enacted by the State Council; 
further details rules may also be promulgated by the ministries in charge under the 
State Council. Even so, Chinese laws adopted in those years were quite brief 
compared with those in the United States and other developed countries. For a 
detailed account on China’s law making, see Guiguo Wang, Wang’s Business Law of 
China, supra.
32) At that time, lawyers and scholars from the United States and elsewhere often advised 
the Chinese government on foreign investment issues, although such advice was given 
unofficially. The Chinese government also sent their officials as visiting scholars to 
foreign countries to study. At least three heads of the Law and Treaties Department 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, predecessor of the 
Ministry of Commerce of China, studied in the United States. Such exchanges helped 
China understand the need of foreign investors greatly. Therefore to use BIT as a means 
for promoting foreign investment was not unthinkable for the Chinese government.
33) Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany 
on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1983).
34) Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the French Republic on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of Investments (1984).
35) Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government 
of the Kingdom of Norway on the Mutual Protection of Investments (1984). See 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_norway.pdf.
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and investors. It emphasizes on the right of subrogation in case of expropriation 
and repatriation of investment. The MFN (MFN) treatment is stipulated but not 
national treatment.
Improvement was made after China gained some experience of foreign investment 
treaties and became more familiar with the international practice. An example is 
the China-UK BIT entered into in 1986,36) in which the Hull Rule for compensation 
for expropriation was accepted. The contents of thereof were also more detailed.
With the help of the above laws and BITs, China achieved good results in 
attracting foreign investment in the 1980s.37) In 1992 late Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping took a tour to the southern part of China to advocate further reform.38) 
Thereafter, the Chinese government formally announced that it would gradually 
adopt the market economy with Chinese characteristics, which triggered another 
wave of inflow of foreign investment.39) 
The surge of foreign capital and technology inflow led to a new stage of participation 
36) Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and North Ireland and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, available at: http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/ 
docs/bits/uk_china.pdf. China and Britain signed a Joint Declaration on the Question 
of Hong Kong in 1984, per which Britain agreed to return Hong Kong to China by 
1997 and China agreed to maintain the capitalist system of Hong Kong thereafter for 
50 years. That was considered by China as a friendly move. Therefore it was understandable 
that China was prepared to make more cessions in its BIT with Britain than with 
others.
37) China signed 19 BITs in 1980s which made it an attractive recipient for foreign 
investment. 
38) After the Tiananmen movement of “June 4”, 1989, foreign countries imposed economic 
sanctions on China. Within the country and among the leadership, there were doubts 
as to whether further opening of the country would be in its best interest. Deng 
Xiaoping, whilst without official position, followed the steps of late Chairman Mao 
Zedong, toured the more liberal minded southern part of China and used his personal 
influence to call upon the leadership for further reform.
39) Article 15 of the Constitution reads: “The State practices planned economy on the 
basis of socialist public ownership. It ensures the proportionate and coordinated 
growth of the national economy through overall balancing by economic planning and 
the supplementary role of regulation by the market”, the 1993 Amendment to the 
Constitution changed “planned economy” into “socialist market economy.”
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by China in international mechanisms. It became a contracting state of the ICSID 
Convention on 6 February 1993,40) although it was considered a small step in 
ensuring protection of foreign investors as China made a reservation that it “would 
only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of ICSID disputes over compensation 
resulting from expropriation or nationalization”.41) Thereafter China accelerated the 
process of concluding new BITs and amending the existing ones. The most recently 
re-negotiated BITs include China-Germany (December 2003),42) China-Finland 
(November 2004), 43)China-Spain (November 2005)44) and China-Portugal (December 
2005).45) 
These newly revised BITs represent China’s current position on international 
investment law. They constitute a new generation of BITs with China’s participation. 
Significant changes that have been built into these BITs include definition of 
investment and investors, treatment of foreign investment, expropriation and 
compensation and dispute settlement in particular investor-state arbitration, etc.
The FTAs to which China is a party also constitute the Chinese mechanisms 
40) China signed the ICSID Convention on February 9, 1990, deposited its ratification on 
January 7, 1993 and became a member state on February 6, 1993. As for China’s 
reservation, see ICSID official document No. ICSID 8-D.
41) The reservation made by China was considered by some as reluctance to accede to 
international arbitration. Mark A. Cymrot, “Investment Disputes with China”, Dispute 
Resolution Journal, Aug-Oct, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3923/is_200608/ 
ai_n16779631.
42) The Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments was signed 
on December 1, 2003 and entered into force on November 11, 2005, http://www.unctad. 
org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_germany.pdf.
43) The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments was signed on November 15, 2004 and entered into force on November 
15, 2006.
44) The Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Spanish Kingdom on 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments was signed on November 
14, 2005; it has not yet entered into force.
45) The Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Portugal 
on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments was signed on December 
9, 2005; it has not yet entered into force.
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relating to foreign investment. China did not participate in FTAs until quite recently. 
The first FTA negotiated by China was with the Association of South East Asia 
Nations (ASEAN) in November 2001.46) One year later, a framework agreement 
was entered into laying out the FTA plan in stages.47) The parties agreed to 
implement an early harvest agreement relating to trade in goods together with a 
dispute settlement mechanism in July 2005, whilst negotiations on trade in services 
were aimed to complete in January 2007 for implementation in July 2007.48) The 
objective of the early harvest agreement is for establishing a full FTA by 2010 
for the six original ASEAN members and in 2015 for the rest four members.49) 
Investment is part of the overall China-ASEAN FTA. Yet, by early 2009, due to 
financial tsunami which had an impact on the world economy, negotiations on 
issues relating to investment had not started.
The China-Chile FTA50) also essentially concentrate on trade issues such as 
elimination of trade barriers, remedies, etc. and almost leaves investment aspect 
untouched, except by stipulating that the parties shall establish close cooperation 
46) At the invitation of Malaysian government, the former Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen attended the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1991, which started the 
bilateral dialogue. China then participated in the 25
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting at 
the invitation of ASEAN Standing Committee. In 1996, China became a full member 
of the dialogue at the 29
th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The formation of a FTA 
between China and ASEAN was suggested by the former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
at China-ASEAN summit on November 6, 2001.
47) The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Association of South East Asian Nations was signed on 
November 4, 2002 in Phnom Penh and entered into force on July 1, 2003. The 
Framework Agreement contains 16 articles to set out the principles of cooperation 
between the parties and to outline a timetable thereof.
48) The early harvest program was stipulated in Article 6 of the Framework Agreement.
49) As its objective, the Framework Agreement wishes to strengthen and enhance economic, 
trade and investment collaboration by progressively relaxing trade and other barriers.  
To achieve the purpose, Articles 2 and 3 provide a timetable for a gradual integration 
of ASEAN members into their FTA with China.
50) Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the Republic Chile was signed on November 18, 2005 in 
Pusan, Korea.
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aims at “stimulating productive synergies, creating new opportunities for trade and 
investment”51) and promoting “the establishment of information exchange channels 
and facilitate full communication and exchange” in policies, laws and economic 
information that may affect investment.52) This lack of detailed mechanism on 
investment was apparently due to China’s inexperience in FTA and its traditional 
narrow view on FTA.
The most comprehensive FTA that China has entered into is that with New 
Zealand which was preceded by the China-Pakistan FTA.53) In general, China’s 
FTA with Pakistan is much less comprehensive than that with New Zealand insofar 
as bilateral investment is concerned. Both FTAs aim at establishing a mechanism 
for promoting cross-boarder direct investment.54) One of the objectives of the 
China-New Zealand FTA is to “substantially increase investment opportunities”.55) 
At the same time, China-Pakistan FTA requires the parties to “encourage investors 
of the other Party to make investments in its territory”.56) Yet, the China-Pakistan 
FTA makes investments to be made “in accordance with its laws and regulations” 
a condition for qualification of protection, whilst the China-New Zealand FTA 
does not have the same condition.  
In addition to Chapter 11 that deals exclusively with investment issues, the 
China-New Zealand FTA emphasizes on “creating new opportunities for …
51) Article 104(b) of China-Chile FTA.
52) Article 112 of China-Chile FTA.
53) The Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was entered into on 
November 24, 2006.
54) For the purpose of promoting bilateral investment, China-New Zealand FTA requires 
the establishment of a Committee on Investment, whilst China-Pakistan FTA has no 
such arrangement. This difference in arrangement shows that China and New Zealand 
give bilateral investment a more important role. See Article 150 of China-China-New 
Zealand FTA.
55) Article 2 of China-New Zealand FTA. Other objectives that are investment related 
include “promote conditions for fair competition in the free trade area”, “provide for 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights” and “eliminate barriers 
to trade in …services”.
56) Article 47 of China-Pakistan FTA.
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investment”.57) This is to echo the objectives of the FTA requiring specific actions 
of the parties. Such actions include policy dialogue and exchange of information, 
providing assistance and facilities to business persons, etc.;58) the implementation 
of this obligation requires positive and concrete actions of the parties which include 
cooperation and information exchange between government institutions, business 
groups and industrial associations, and holding investment marts.59) 
Another distinct feature of China-New Zealand FTA is its emphasis on the 
special interest of small and medium-sized enterprises. This is a reflection of the 
economic and business reality of the bilateral relationship: because of the size of 
the New Zealand mark, it is more attractive to the small and medium-sized Chinese 
entities to invest; also the majority of Chinese business entities are also relatively 
small. Therefore to promote investment by such enterprises is in the interest of 
China and New Zealand.60) 
II. Qualified Investments and Investors
For promotion and protection of foreign investment, qualification by BITS and 
FTAs of investments and investors is essential, as whether a given investment or 
investor should be granted treaty treatment depends on such qualification. In this 
regard, the China-Norway BIT, one of the earliest bilateral agreements on investment 
China entered into, provides:
57) Article 173(b) of China-New Zealand FTA.
58) Article 175.2 of China-New Zealand FTA. No similar provisions are found in China- 
Pakistan FTA. It is a reflection of China’s caution in committing the establishment of 
a comprehensive mechanism which it may not be able to handle.
59) Article 176.2 (a) and (c) of China-New Zealand FTA. 
60) Most of the provisions of Chapter 14 on Cooperation were related to small and medium- 
sized enterprises. These provisions require the Contracting Parties to take government 
measures for promoting co-operations of small and medium-sized enterprises of both 
countries.
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The term “investing” means assets permitted by either contracting party in 
accordance with its laws and regulations, including, in particular:
a. Movable and immovable property and other property rights such as mortgages, 
pledges, liens, usufruct, and other similar rights;
b. Shares, stock, and debentures of companies or interests in the property of 
such companies;
c. Claims to money or to any performance under contract having a monetary 
value;
d. Copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents, trademarks and external 
designs of industrial products), know-how, and goodwill; and 
e. Concessions conferred by law or under contract permitted by law, including 
concessions to search for and exploit natural resources.
The definition of “investment” in the China-Norway BIT, though relatively 
incomplete compared with those of modern ones, has the effect of filling the gap 
of Chinese law,61) as in the Chinese legal system, international treaty provisions 
prevail over local laws in case of conflict.62) That was precisely the use of BITs 
61) None of the Chinese laws contains detailed definition of foreign “investment”. In general, 
Chinese law regards cash, equipment, technology and intellectual property rights 
contributed by foreign investors as investment. Yet, it does not define the outer limit 
of the rights arising from such invested items. For example, Article 5 of the 
Chinese-foreign Joint Venture Law reads: “Each party to a joint venture may make 
its investment in cash, in kind or in industrial property rights, etc. The technology 
and the equipment that serve as the foreign party’s investment must be advanced 
technology and equipment that actually suit our country’s needs. If the foreign party 
causes losses by deception through the intentional use of backward technology and 
equipment, it shall pay compensation for the losses. The investment of a Chinese joint 
venture may include the right to the use of a site provided for the joint venture during 
the period of its operation. If the right to the use of the site does not constitute a 
part of the Chinese party’s investment, the joint venture shall pay the Chinese Government 
a fee for its use. The various investments referred to above shall be specified in the 
joint venture contract and articles of association and the value of each (excluding that 
of the site) shall be jointly assessed by the parties to the venture.”
62) Article 142 of the General Principle of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 
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in the development of the Chinese legal system on protection of foreign investment.  
The China-UK BIT, which was agreed upon a few years later, gives investment 
a broader definition than that of China-Norway BIT. It states, “Investment means 
every kind of asset accepted as investment by a contracting party” and that it 
“includes investments existing at the date of entry into force of this Agreement; 
and a change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their 
character as investments”.63) In the current generation of BITs that China has 
entered into, “investment” has been further expanded. For instance, the 2003 
China-Germany BIT defines investment as “every kind of asset invested directly 
or indirectly by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party”.64) With the broad definition to include investment made 
“indirectly”, the China-Germany BIT’s coverage is much wider than the previous 
ones.65) The China-Germany BIT also enumerates on non-exclusive basis activities 
that should be considered as investment, including:66) 
provides that where any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China contains 
provisions differing from those in the laws of the country, the provisions of the 
international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are the ones on which China has 
made a reservation. Article 236 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law provides that 
where an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of 
China contains provisions differing from those found in this Law, the provisions of 
the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are the ones on which China 
has announced reservations.
63) Article 1(1)(a) of the 1986 China-UK BIT.
64) Article 1(1) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT.
65) Article 1(1) of The 1983 China-Germany BIT provides that “Investment” means all 
the assets under the effective laws of the contracting parties, mainly include: (a) ownership 
rights of movable and immovable property and other property rights such as mortgages 
and pledges; (b) shares and other kind of interest in companies; (c) claim to money 
that can be used in creating economic value or to any other performance having an 
economic value; (d) copyrights, industrial property rights, technical processes, know-how, 
trademarks and trade names; and (e) concession rights, including concessions to search 
for, exploit and extract. 
66) This is comparable with the recent US model BIT under which “investment” means 
every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the 
characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of 
capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.  
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a. movable and immovable property and other property rights such as mortgages 
and pledges;
b. shares, debentures, stock and any other kind of interest in companies;
c. claims to money or to any other performance having an economic value 
associated with an investment;
d. intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, patents and industrial 
designs, trademarks, trade-names, technical processes, trade and business 
secrets, know-how and good-will;
e. business concessions conferred by law or under contract permitted by law, 
including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural 
resources.67) 
Compared with the 1983 agreement, the current China-German BIT includes 
stocks and shares, business secrets and good-will, and concessions to search for 
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources as investment. In addition, the open-ended 
definition of investment— “includes, though not exclusively”—may extend the 
application of the BIT to any extent.68) Obviously in order to maintain the scope 
of application within the expectation of the parties, the Protocol to the BIT69) 
Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an enterprise; (b) shares, stock, and 
other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; (c) bonds, debentures, other debt 
instruments and loans; (d) futures, options, and other derivatives; (e) turnkey, construction, 
management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts; (f) 
intellectual property rights; (g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred 
pursuant to domestic law; and (h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable 
property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges.
67) Article 1(1) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT.
68) In Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, promissory notes were taken as qualified 
investment. One of the rational for the tribunal for the conclusion was that Article 1 
of the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT gave an open-end definition for investment by 
providing that “the term ‘investments’ shall comprise every kind of asset and more 
particularly though not exclusively…” See Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3), Decision on Jurisdiction, July 11, 1997.
69) The Protocol and the BIT between China and Germany were signed on the same day.  
The preamble of the Protocol states: “On signing the Agreement…, the plenipotentiaries, 
being duly authorized, have, in addition, agreed on the following provisions, which 
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stipulates that “investments” are those “made for the purpose of establishing lasting 
economic relations in connection with an enterprise, especially those which [are] 
allow[ed] to exercise effective influence in its management”. The Protocol further 
defines indirect investment as those “invested by an investor of one Contracting 
Party through a company which is fully or partially owned by the investor and 
having its seat in the territory of the other Contracting Party”. The Protocol is an 
integral part of the BIT and the two were entered into at the same time. The 
restrictions made in the Protocol were a compromise of the parties; a Chinese 
negotiator told this author that the “indirect investment” was too uncertain for 
China but Germany insisted to have it stipulated in the BIT.70) As a result, whilst 
the BIT explicitly provides for protection of indirect investment, the Protocol 
stipulates restrictions to narrow down the application of such provisions. This practice 
also reflects the cultural sensitivity in BIT negotiations.  
The China-New Zealand FTA has a wider definition of investment than that of 
the China-German BIT. It covers, in addition, “bonds, including government issued 
bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, and rights derived there from;” 
and “any right conferred by law or under contract and any licenses and permits 
pursuant to law.”71) In comparison, the China-Pakistan FTA’s definition of investment 
is almost identical with that of China-German BIT.72) Another notable difference 
is that in China-Pakistan FTA, it is provided that “any change in the form in 
which assets are invested does not affect their character as investments provided 
that such a change is in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Party in 
whose territory the investment has been made”, whilst in both China-New Zealand 
shall be regarded as an integral part of the said Agreement”.
70) It is also the practice of China in international treaty making that less important provisions 
and concrete provisions as well as those that may be amended afterwards may be stipulated 
in a separate document such as a protocol of the main agreement.
71) Article 135 of China-New Zealand FTA. It also stipulates that non-interest bearing loans 
and other forms of debt should be treated as investments, provided that they are 
registered with the competent authorities of a Party.
72) Article 46 of China-Pakistan FTA does not include industrial design in its definition 
of investment.
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FTA and China-German BIT, the words “provided … made” are not included.  
The BITs and FTAs that China has entered into turn to list possible areas and 
activities as investment which is common in international investment treaties. As a 
consequence, what may constitute an investment is subject to interpretation in practice, 
which is also often the source for disputes. Although China has not yet been 
involved in an investor-state arbitration, related decisions made by arbitral tribunals 
are of significance in determining how the provisions be interpreted in practice. 
The best known criteria established for determining investment are the “Salini test”, 
according to which the notion of investment must include the following: (a) a contribution 
of money or other assets of economic value, (b) a certain duration, (c) an element 
of risk, and (d) a contribution to the host State’s development.73)    
China would welcome the “Salini test”, albeit the last one of which has been 
criticized by some,74) as whether a given investment is contributable to the economic 
development may be difficult to ascertain. As discussed earlier, Chinese law requires 
foreign investors to contribute advanced technology which in the view of China 
will contribute to the economic development. Suppose a foreign investor is found 
having failed to provide advanced technology and the Chinese government, local 
or central, decides to suspend preferential treatment to the foreign investor. The 
question whether the investment concerned is qualified for protection must arise.  
The tribunal in charge will need to decide whether the Chinese authorities were at 
fault in approving the foreign investment and if not, whether the foreign investor 
acted deceptively. Any major investment will involve a substantial period of 
preparation, construction and operation before profit-making. Where the Chinese 
government, after supposedly examination of documents and business plans of 
foreign investment, approved the project and later on decides that the investment 
73) See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/OO/4, Decision on Jurisdiction of 23 July 2001, 42 ILM, 2003, passim.
74) For instance, it was put in doubt by the tribunal of L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. Republique 
Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, Decision on jurisdiction of 12 July 2006, para. 
72.
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is not qualified to enjoy preferential treatment due to the technology invested 
being less advanced, arbitral tribunals are unlikely to be sympathetic.75) Thus the 
BITs entered into may play a crucial role in protecting foreign investors’ interests.
The BITs entered into by China prior to the mid 1990s all require that 
investment must be made “in accordance with the laws and regulations” of the 
host country. The recently concluded BITs, however, do not include such requirement. 
The China-German BIT simply defines investment as “every kind of asset invested 
directly or indirectly by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party”.76) Article 2 on Promotion and Protection of Investment 
states that “Each Contracting Party shall encourage investors of the other Contracting 
Party to make investments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance 
with its laws and regulations.” It then continues to provide for constant protection 
and security.77) China-New Zealand FTA not only does not require foreign 
investment to be made by following host country laws but also omits such provisions 
in the articles stipulating treatment of foreign investments. This is in contrast with 
the China-Pakistan FTA which contains similar stipulations like those in the first 
generation BITs of China.78) 
The differences in treaty requirements like those entered into by China on 
investment making may lead to problems in practice. It can be argued, as 
China-New Zealand FTA was entered into subsequent to the China-Pakistan FTA 
and as the former does not require investment to be made “in accordance with the 
75) For instance, in Saipem, the tribunal stated that since “Saipem invested substantial 
technical, financial and human resources in the project, which gave a substantial 
contribution to Bangladesh’s economic development, and it assumed risks for a significant 
duration (the performance phase lasted two and a half years)”, the related contract was 
an investment. Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/07, Para. 100.
76) Article 1(1) of China-German BIT.
77) Article 2(2) of China-German BIT.
78) Article 46 of China-Pakistan FTA provides the term investment “means every kind of 
asset invested by investors of one Party in accordance with the laws and regulations 
of the other Party in the territory of the latter”. It should be noted that the China- 
Pakistan FTA was conclude before that of the China-New Zealand FTA.
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laws and regulations of the host country”, at least the Chinese government was 
not unaware of the significance of the omission. In practice, such omission may 
stop China (of course also New Zealand) from claiming an investment to be 
unqualified. For instance, in Fraport,79) the term “in accordance with the laws and 
regulations” was interpreted as a condition for investment making and hence a 
pre-condition for the giving of consent by the host country for investor-state 
arbitration. In that case, the BIT between the Philippines and Germany defines 
investment as “any kind of asset accepted in accordance with the respective laws 
and regulations of either Contracting State”80) and requires the Contracting State 
to “promote as far as possible investment in its territory by investors of the other 
Contracting State and admit such investment in accordance with its Constitution, 
law and regulations.”81) Fraport, the foreign investor, entered into a secret shareholders 
agreement whereby secured managerial control of the investment project, Terminal 
3 of Ninoy Aquino International Airport of the Philippines, in violation of the 
Philippine Anti-Dummy Law (“ADL”). 
The Tribunal of which Professor Michael Reisman was a member held that “In 
summary, Fraport had been fully advised and was fully aware of the ADL and 
the incompatibility with the ADL of the structure of its investment which it 
planned and ultimately put into place with the secret shareholder agreements.”82) 
Based on the fact that the foreign investor knowingly made an investment not “in 
accordance” with local law, the Fraport tribunal decided not to recourse to the 
object and purpose interpretative technique of treaties to offer protection to the 
foreign investor. In its view, “It is also clear that the parties were anxious to 
encourage investments, which are the raison d’etre of the treaty. But while a 
treaty should be interpreted in the light of its objects and purposes, it would be a 
79) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Phlippines, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/25, August 16, 2007.
80) Article 1 of the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic 
of the Philippines concerning the promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments.
81) Id., Article 2.
82) Fraport, para. 327.
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violation of all the canons of interpretation to pretend to use its objects and purposes, 
which are, by their nature, a deduction on the part of the interpreter, to nullify four 
explicit provisions. Plainly, as indicated by these four provisions, economic transactions 
undertaken by a national of one of the parties to the BIT had to meet certain legal 
requirements of the host state in order to qualify as an ‘investment’ and fall under 
the Treaty.”83) The tribunal hence ruled that ICSID had no jurisdiction on the 
dispute as the Philippine consent for ICSID arbitration was conditioned on valid 
investment according to the BIT. Based the rulings of Fraport, even though Chinese 
law may require foreign investments must meet certain requirements including 
advanced technology, etc., as international treaty provisions prevail over national 
laws in case of conflict, the China-New Zealand FTA type agreements may enable 
foreign investors not to obey the Chinese law. The Chinese government still requires 
foreign investors to go through approval process when making an investment. 
Once approval is given, it is more difficult for the Chinese government to argue 
that a given investment was not made in accordance with Chinese law. 
The approval processes may work for China as recipient of foreign capital 
where foreign investor fails to fully disclose or deliberately makes false disclosure 
of the information required by law. The case in point is Plama,84) where foreign 
investors failed to disclose the shareholding of the entity through which investment 
was made, the tribunal held the deliberate concealment of shareholding “amounting 
to fraud, calculated to induce the Bulgarian authorities to authorize the transfer of 
shares to an entity that did not have the financial and managerial capacities 
required”85) for an oil refinery. In reaching its decision, the tribunal elaborated at 
83) Fraport, para. 340. The Fraport tribunal was obviously convinced by the evidence introduced 
by the foreign investor that “Even assuming, however, that the ‘preponderance of evidence’ 
test which applies in civil law must yield in the instant case to a ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ test because the subject of the ‘in accordance’ inquiry is a Philippine criminal 
statute, this is a case in which res ipsa loquitur. The relevant facts, all of which are 
found in Fraport’s own documents, are incontrovertible.” Id., para. 399.
84) Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
August 27, 2008.
85) Plama, para. 135.
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length “good faith” as a general principle in business transactions including 
international investment. The decision of the tribunal apparently rests on the fact 
that under Bulgarian law, operation of an oil refinery requires approval of the 
government and that the foreign investor’s concealment of shareholding was for 
the purpose of obtaining the host government approval which was given upon 
false qualification of the foreign investor.86) In other words, the foreign investor 
used bad faith as a means to obtain the approval of the host government which in 
itself violated the local law and as a result was not entitled to the protection of 
the relevant treaty—Energy Charter Treaty.87) 
Compared with international practice, the lack of requirement of investment 
making in compliance with the local laws may lead to disputes. For instance, where 
a foreign investor makes an investment in China and the Chinese government 
does not raise any questions, in arbitration or other form of dispute resolution, it 
will be difficult for the Chinese government to avail non-compliance with local 
law as a basis to exclude the investment from treaty coverage. The only possible 
defense that China may have is “good faith”. Yet, to what extent this defense can 
go is still doubtful. In balance, although it is understandable that for purposes of 
competing with other countries in the region for foreign capital, China decided to 
eliminate the requirement of compliance with local laws and regulations, in the 
86) The tribunal stated that “This [non-disclosure of shareholding] may be acceptable in 
some cases but not under the present circumstances in which the State’s approval of 
the investment was required as a matter of law and dependant on the financial and 
technical qualifications of the investor. If a material change occurred in the investor’s 
shareholding that could have an effect on the host State’s approval, the investor was, 
by virtue of the principle of good faith, obliged to inform the host State of such 
change.” See Plama, para. 145.
87) These rulings are in compliance with the findings of some international organizations.  
UNCTAD for instance suggests that there should be limitations in interpreting investment 
agreements, that is “investment that was not established in accordance with the host 
country’s laws and regulations would not fall within the definition of ‘investment’ as 
used in the agreement”. The purpose is said “to induce foreign investors to ensure 
that all local laws and regulations are satisfied in the course of establishing an 
investment”. See UNNCTAD, Scope and Definition: UNCTAD Series on issues in 
international investment agreements p. 24.
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long run China may have to pay a high price. The inconsistency of treaty 
provisions may further complicate the matter. 
With regard to “investors” which is another important aspect of international 
investment law, the China-Norway BIT does not contain a general definition of 
“investor” it defines “nationals” as natural persons with the nationality of China or 
Norway, and “companies” as the legal persons of either party.88) At the time of 
ratifying the China-Norway BIT, China did not have a company law.89) The 
concept of “companies” was unclear. To accommodate both parties, the China-Norway 
BIT provides that as for China, companies are “economic bodies incorporated and 
domiciled” in China. In respect of Norway, companies are “judicial persons and 
sole proprietors domiciled in the territory of Norway, or companies and associations, 
regardless of whether or not the liabilities of its partners, members or constituents 
are limited, and regardless of whether their activities are profit-oriented”.90) The 
protection is accorded by one contracting party to nationals and companies of the 
other.91) 
Regarding natural person investors, the China-Germany BIT provides that as 
neither party recognizes dual-nationality, the national law of each party should be 
referred to for the purpose of ascertaining nationality issues.92) 
88) Article 3 and 4 of the 1984 China-Norway BIT.
89) Before the promulgation of the Company Law in 1993, different Chinese laws governing 
enterprises were adopted based on the ownership of enterprises. Whilst the Chinese- 
foreign Joint Venture Law was adopted in 1979, the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People was promulgated in 1988.
90) Article 4(2) of the 1984 China-Norway BIT.
91) In theory, the national treatment was mutually applicable to both the Chinese and 
Norwegian investors. As at that time no Chinese entities making investment in Norway, 
the benefit of this provision was one sided. It was since 1983 that Norwegian companies 
started to invest in China. The main sectors of investment are post and telecommunications, 
electronics, machinery, transportation, light industry, agriculture and environmental 
protection. Most of the investment projects are located in Eastern coastal cities. See 
http://www.tpbjc.gov.cn/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=12803.  
92) Article 2(1)(a) and Article 2(2)(a) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT. According to 
Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Chinese Nationality Law, any person born in China or 
abroad whose parents are Chinese nationals or one of them is a Chinese national has 
the Chinese nationality. Where a person whose parents are Chinese nationals but have 
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For non-natural-person investors, the China-Germany BIT deleted a provision in 
the previous BIT that required a Chinese non-natural investor to “be entitled to do 
business with foreigners” at that time an enterprise that wished to engage in 
business transactions with a foreign counterpart must first secure approval of the 
government.93) The current China-Germany BIT sets forth that “economic entities 
incorporated and constituted under the laws and regulations of China, irrespective 
of whether or not for profit and whether their liabilities are limited or not” may 
be qualified as investors on condition that they have their seats/domicile in the 
territory of China.94) The requirement for a German legal person investor is to 
have its seat in the territory of Germany. This “seat” test, however, may give rise 
to difficulties, as it is unclear with a mere registration of a company in the territory 
of either party would satisfy the requirement.95) The 2005 China-Finland BIT 
requires both incorporation and registered office as conditions in determining 
settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, 
and who has acquired a foreign nationality at birth shall not have the Chinese nationality.
93) Article 7 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law of 1985 provides that Contracts which 
were subject to the approval of the state, as provided for by the laws or administrative 
regulations of the People’s Republic of China, should be formed only after such 
approval was granted. With the entering into force of the Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on October 1, 1999, the Economic Contract Law ceased to be 
effective on the same day. The current Contract Law does not contain provisions 
requiring commercial contracts with foreign counterparts to be approved before coming 
into force. Yet, other Chinese laws require certain types of transactions to be subject 
to government approval.
94) Article 2(2)(b) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT.
95) Article 2 of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China provides, “The 
term ‘company’ as mentioned in this Law refers to a limited liability company or a 
joint stock company limited set up within the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China according to the provisions of this Law.” Under Article 10, “A company shall 
regard its main office as its domicile.” According to Article 39 of the General Principles 
of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, “A legal person’s domicile shall 
be the place where its main administrative office is located.” Article 184 of the Opinions 
of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Implementation of the 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (For Trial 
Implementation) stipulates however that for a foreign legal person, the law of its 
registration country shall be deemed as its governing law, and the capacity for civil 
conduct of a legal person shall be determined according to its governing law.
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nationality of legal entities.96) 
 
 
The China-New Zealand FTA affords protection to enterprise investors which 
are “constituted or organized under the law of a Party, and a subsidiary located in 
the territory of a Party and engaged in substantive business operations there”.97) A 
plain reading of the above provision would mean that where an entity from one 
Party to set up an enterprise (subsidiary) in the territory of the other Party, the 
subsidiary may not be entitled to the treaty protection unless it engages in 
substantive business activities. Where the position is clear for entities to set up 
subsidiaries in the territory of the other Party, there is no similar requirement in 
relation to natural persons from one Party who have constituted or organized 
entities in the other Party. This situation is dealt with in Article 149 (Denial of 
Benefits), subsection (b) of which permits a Contracting Party to deny the benefits 
to “Investors of the other Party where the investment is being made by an 
enterprise that is owned or controlled by persons of the denying Party and the 
enterprise has no substantive business operations in the territory of the other 
Party.” The word “persons” without doubt covers both legal and natural persons.98) The 
essence of these provisions is to prevent Tokios Tokeles99) situation where control 
test was decided not to apply in determining the nationality of foreign investors. 
96) The China-Finland BIT defines “investor” as: (b) any legal entity, …incorporated or 
constituted under the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party and having its 
registered office in that Contracting Party.
97) Article 135 of China-New Zealand FTA. Natural person investors include those having 
a permanent status in one of the Parties. As China has not yet any law or regulation 
giving permanent status to foreigners, the FTA prescribes that upon China adopts 
such laws, these provisions will apply. In China-Pakistan FTA “investors” include “(a) 
natural persons who have nationality of either Party in accordance with the laws of 
that Party; (b) legal entities, including companies, associations, partnerships and other 
organizations, incorporated or constituted under the laws and regulations of either 
Party and have their seats in that Party”. See Article 46(3) of China-Pakistan FTA.
98) As the “denial of benefit” applies to the matters covered in the entire chapter on 
investment, all treatments including dispute resolution to foreign investors and investments 
are likely to be affected. 
99) Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18), 29 June 2007, Award on 
Jurisdiction.
China’s Practice in International Investment Law / Wang, Guiguo   213
In Tokios Tokeles, the complainant which was a publishing company of Lithuania, 
whose 99% shares owned by Ukrainians, established a wholly owned subsidiary 
(Taki spravy) in Ukraine to conduct publication and advertisement business. Taki 
Spravy published a book in favor of the opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko. The 
Ukrainian government apparently didn’t like it and from then on problem began. 
The Ukrainian government took several measures against Taki Spravy including 
tax investigation, cancellation of contracts, placing assets under administrative arrest, 
seizure of financial documents, etc. In the arbitration, the respondent Ukraine 
argued that Tokios Tokeles was 99% owned by Ukrainians and therefore was not 
an investor under the investment agreement of the two counties. The Tribunal held 
that under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Connection, the nationality of juridical 
persons should be mainly determined on the basis of place of incorporation and 
that nationality of a company did not depend upon the nationality of the 
controlling shareholders. In Tokios Tokeles, the foreign investment even did not 
involve a transfer of funds from Lithuania to Ukrainian. Yet, that did not bother 
the Tribunal in determining the nature of foreign investment as in its view the 
source of invested capital did not have to be from a foreign country under the 
ICSID Convention. This award, albeit it may be intended to advocate the policy 
for promoting foreign investment, is contrary to the very intent of the ICSID 
Convention, i.e., to resolve disputes between an investment host country and a 
foreign national. Unless control test is applied, any investor may make use of the 
device of incorporation in a foreign country for the purpose of challenging its own 
government in an international forum.100) This is the situation that the Chinese 
government has always tried to avoid.101) The half-way approach taken by the 
China-New Zealand FTA is apparently another compromise.
100) For discussions on this point, see the dissenting opinion of president of the Tokios 
Tokeles tribunal.
101) Even some Chinese scholars have difficulties in accepting the Tokios Tokeles award.  
See Zhu Yansheng, “The Theories and Practice on the Nationality of Legal Person 
under the ICSID Regime”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 13, No. 1 
(2006), pp. 244-257.
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III. Treatment of Investment
Treatment of foreign investors and investments is the center issue of any BIT. 
The basis on which to hold the host government responsible is that the body that 
acts or omits to act is part of the government. Another condition for the host 
government to be responsible is that the failure of performing the obligation must 
be proved on the fact that a promise has been made. In Fireman’s Fund Insurance, 
a claim was based on the negotiation, development, and ultimate rejection of a 
Recapitalization Program by a Working Group established by the Mexican 
Government which argued that no legal claims could be based on the activities of 
the Working Group, because it was, under the Mexican law, not a governmental 
organization with decision-making authority or power to bind the State.102) The 
tribunal did not directly address the issue as to whether the Working Group was 
part of the Mexican government. Rather, it ruled that the “evidence submitted to 
the Tribunal does not show a case of a commitment made on behalf of Mexico 
by the Working Group and subsequently repudiated by the State”, as the Working 
Group was a “forum in which proposals of various kinds were discussed among 
the relevant Mexican agencies and with interested outside parties, subject at all 
times to ratification or rejection by the competent government authorities”.103) It 
also stated that the complainant “should have known and did know that while the 
recommendations of the Working Group were crucial” to decision-making by the 
government, they were nonetheless recommendations only.104) 
BITs seldom list the authorities of the BIT contracting parties whose conduct or 
omission would attribute to those of the contracting parties. In practice, such 
issues are determined in accordance with international law in particular customary 
international law. The Articles on Responsibilities of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts adopted in 2001 by the International Law Commission and 
102) Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional 
Facility), July 17, 2006, Para. 149.
103) Id., Para. 150.
104) Id., Para. 153.
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commended to the attention of Governments by the UN General Assembly in 
Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 (the ILC Articles) are often referred to by 
tribunals. According to the ILC Articles, the conduct of any state organ, being 
legislative, executive or judiciary or central or local government bodies, in compliance 
with the laws of that state, must be considered an act of that state under international 
law.105) Such acts are generally referred to as acts of de jure organs. An act of 
state may also be attributed to the conduct of a person or entity which is not a 
de jure organ but which is empowered by the internal law to exercise elements of 
governmental authority, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in 
the particular instance.106) Under the Articles of ILC, in fact, even the conduct of 
a person or group of persons who are not part of the government may be 
considered an act of their State under international law, provided they act “on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the 
conduct”.107) 
Insofar as treatment standard is concerned, around 20% of the BITs that China 
has entered into provide for national treatment108) and most of its recently 
concluded BITs contain the relative treatment standard— either national treatment 
or MFN treatment with better treatment applicable as well as fair and equitable 
standard.109)
 
These standards have been incorporated into the China-Germany BIT 
105) Article 4 of the ILC Articles.
106) Article 5 of ILC Articles.
107) Article 8 of ILC Articles.
108) Among the 117 BITS China has entered into so far only 17 provide for national 
treatment, whilst the others stipulate fair and equitable treatment as the standard.  
See Zhang Caixia, “Review and Re-establish the National Treatment System in 
Sino-Foreign BITs”, Rule of Law Tribune, Vol. No. 1, 2007, pp. 240-248.
109) For example, Article 3 of the 2005 China-Portugal BIT provides: (1) Investments of 
investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party. (2) Each Contracting Party 
shall accord to investments and activities associated with such investments by the 
investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded 
to the investments and associated activities by its own investors. (3) Neither Contracting 
Party shall subject investments and activities associated with such investments by the 
investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that accorded 
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which are applicable to “investments and activities associated with such investments”. 
It should be noted, however, that it is far from clear as to what may constitute an 
activity associated with or relating to an investment. The explanation given in the 
Protocol to the China-Germany BIT offers little assistance in this regard. It sets 
out: “the following shall more particularly, though not exclusively, be deemed 
‘activity’ within the meaning of Article 3 (2): the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment and disposal of an investment.”110) Whatsoever purpose it may try to 
serve, the term “though not exclusively” should be interpreted to include any 
activity that may be reasonably justified as related to an investment. Of course, a 
question that may immediately be raised is whether the national and MFN treatment 
under the BIT could be applied to pre-investment activities.111) 
The 2004 China-Finland BIT, explicitly stipulates that national treatment is only 
applied “with respect to the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
expansion, sale or other disposal of investments that have been made.”112) At the 
same time, “With respect to the establishment, acquisition, operation, management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment, expansion, sale or other disposal of investments,”113) 
 
to the investments and associated activities by the investors of any third State. 
Article 3 of the 2005 China-Czech BIT reads: (1) Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord to investments and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party 
treatment which is fair and equitable and not less favorable than that which it accords 
to investments and returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of investors 
of any third State, whichever is more favorable. (2) Each Contracting Party shall in 
its territory accord to investors of the other Contracting Party, as regards management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investment, treatment which is fair 
and equitable and not less favorable than that which it accords to its own investors 
or to investors of any third State, whichever is more favorable.
110) Ad Article 3 of the Protocol to the Agreement between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments.
111) Chinese law has no provisions for pre-investment national treatment. China is now 
an observer of the Energy Charter Treaty which requires pre-investment to be 
afforded national treatment. It is therefore not unforeseeable that China may accept 
pre-investment national treatment in its BITs as that will give additional protection to 
its investment abroad.
112) Article 3(2) of the 2005 China-Finland BIT.
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the MFN treatment applies. Like the NAFTA Agreement, the China-Finland BIT 
provides that “each Contracting Party shall accord to investments by the investors 
of the other Contracting Party the treatment, which, according to the investor is 
more favorable,”114) which means that the investors concerned may choose what 
treatment to receive. In this regard, there would not be any problem as China has 
always accorded foreign investors more favorable treatment than that to its own 
nationals.115) 
Concerning the treatment standards, the following China-Portugal BIT is typical 
in which reference is made to international law, Article 10(1) of which states, “if 
the provisions of law of either Contracting Party or obligations under international 
law existing at present or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties in 
addition to the present Agreement contain regulations entitling investments by 
investors of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than is 
provided for by the present Agreement, such regulations shall, to the extent that 
they are more favourable, prevail over the present Agreement.”116) Such provisions 
may beg more questions than resolving any, as what may constitute international 
standard is, to say the least, very uncertain.117) The situation that they may catch 
113) Article 3(3) of the 2005 China-Finland BIT.
114) Article 3(4) of the 2005 China-Finland BIT.
115) For example, according to the Circular of the State Council of China on Adjustment 
of Imported Equipment Taxation Policies, the State Council decided that starting 
from January 1, 1998, imported equipment of domestic investment projects and foreign 
investment projects encouraged by the State shall enjoy exemption from tariff and import 
stage value-added tax within the specified scope. Before January 1, 2007 when the 
Decision of the State Council on Amending the Interim Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on City and Town Land Use Tax entered into force, foreign-invested 
enterprises had been exempted from the land use tax. They also enjoyed lower income 
tax before January 1, 2008 when the Enterprise Income Tax Law entered into force.
116) Article 10(1) of the 2005 China-Portugal BIT, http://www.chinahotelsreservation.com/ 
china_law/Agreement_between_china_law_the_Government526.html. Other BITs that include 
the same provisions include China-Tunisia BIT (2004), the China-Bosnia BIT (2002), 
and the China-Netherlands BIT (2001).
117) The Neer case was regarded as the historical starting point of the standard of treatment 
to foreigners. According to the Commission, “the treatment of an alien, in order to 
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to outrage, to bad faith, to 
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is that when China joins the Energy Charter Treaty and gives pre-investment 
national treatment to foreign investors.
As discussed earlier, in China’s practice, the protection and treatment, both 
national and most favored treatment, offered to investors are without exceptions.  
This is in contrast with NAFTA, Article 1410(1) of which provides: “Nothing in 
this Part shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining 
reasonable measures for prudential reasons”, even if the effect of such measures 
(as contrasted with their motive or intent) is discriminatory.118) The NAFTA 
exception of prudential measures is apparently confined to financial measures.119) 
In China’s specific commitments relating to service sector for joining the WTO, a 
similar provision was included. As it is very difficult, if not impossible, to draw a 
line between investment and trade in services in most of the cases, in practice this 
may cause difficulties. For instance, where a measure is introduced by the Chinese 
willful neglect of duty or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily 
recognize its insufficiency.” See L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v. United 
Mexian States, October 15, 1926, para. 4, in United Nations, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards (2006), pp. 60-66. In practice, however, some tribunals departed 
from the high standard and held that the minimum standard was evolving with time 
passing by. For example, in the ADF case, the tribunal interpreted customary 
international law referred in Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA as “not ‘frozen in time’ 
and that the minimum standard of treatment dose evolve…what customary international 
law projects is not a static photograph of the minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens as it stood in 1927 when the Award in the Neer case was rendered. For both 
customary international law and the minimum standard of treatment of aliens it 
incorporated are constantly in a process of development.” ADF Group Inc. v. USA, 
Award of January 9, 2003, para 179. 
118) Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional 
Facility), Para. 162.
119) Olin L. Wethington, the US principal negotiator for financial service under NAFTA 
writes: “Article 1410(1)(a) … carves out of the national treatment and other 
obligations of the financial services chapter a right to take reasonable measures even 
though discriminatory in application, to protect the safety and soundness of the 
financial system. This regulatory prerogative to protect the integrity of the financial 
system is accepted internationally.” Olin L Wethington, Financial Market Liberalization, 
at ss 5.07 (Sheppard’s McGraw Hill 1994).
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government pursuant to the prudential principle under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (“GATS”), it may be judged against the provisions of BITs 
relating to fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, etc. As the WTO 
dispute resolution mechanisms only permit Members to institute complaints, private 
investors are likely to choose international arbitration as forum for resolving their 
disputes with the Chinese government. In the circumstance, may the Chinese 
government use GATS compliance as a defense for not providing fair and equitable 
treatment or national treatment?
The fair and equitable treatment has already become a standard treatment in 
China’s recent BITs the China-Germany BIT, the China-Finland BIT, the China-Spain 
BIT and the China-Portugal BIT have all adopted largely the following “investments 
of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party”.120) The China-Russia 
BIT concluded in 2006 followed the precedents even though it adopted a slightly 
different wording.121)   
The fair and equitable treatment is not a new concept in international investment 
law. Yet, recent arbitral awards involving Argentina and other countries have 
certainly sent a strong signal that the clause may have devastating impact on the 
legal system and laws of the host countries.122) China was of course not unaware 
120) Article 3(1) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT, Article 3(1) of the China-Finland BIT, 
Article 3(1) of the China-Spain BIT, and Article 3(1) of the China-Portugal BIT.
121) Article III (1) of the 2006 China-Russia BIT provides that “each Contracting Party 
shall ensure in its territory fair and equitable treatment of the investments made by 
investors of the other Contracting Party and activities in connection with such 
investments.”
122) Currently no consensus has been drawn out of international arbitration practice. Where 
the factual situations are the same, different arbitration tribunals, relying on different 
BIT with almost identical provisions, came to contradictory decisions relating to the 
host country’s obligations under the fair and equitable treatment. See CME Czech 
Republic B. V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL and Lauder v. The Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL. Of course, it may be argued that in every legal proceeding, there are always 
at least two lawyers, that is every provision may be subject to two interpretations. It 
is equally true that judges of the same court or different courts may take different 
views on the same legal issue. The fact of inconsistence in arbitration practice may, 
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of the potential consequence of the fair and equitable clause. Yet it still decided 
to have the clause stated in its BITs which shows that China is determined to be 
a responsible member of the international community and to let its laws and 
administrative decisions be subject to the scrutiny of international arbitration.123) 
For a country with the communist party at the helm of affairs, this is in itself an 
important contribution to international investment law.
The China-New Zealand FTA, as a matter of principle, does not apply to trade 
in services. Yet, it extends its application to government measures that affect the 
supply of services through commercial presence in respect of transfer of funds, 
fair and equitable treatment, compensation, expropriation and subrogation. In such 
matters, a service supplier may invoke the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism 
in resolving their differences with the host government.124) 
Constant protection and security, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment 
and MFN treatment have now become standard treatment in China’s BITs. The 
China-Pakistan FTA follows the suit of China-German BIT including the limitations 
with regard to application of the MFN treatment.125) Article 48(3) of China-Pakistan 
FTA modified China-German BIT slightly by providing the MFN treatment shall 
not authorize the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege “by virtue of: 
however, hinder the acceptance of the provisions, although no solution is yet available.
123) Once an arbitration tribunal decides that China is in breach of its obligations under 
the fair and equitable treatment clause, it is bond to amend its laws if the legal provisions 
are the source of the breach or to change the behaviors of the government if such 
behaviors are questioned. It is exactly in this context that BITs will have an important 
effect on Chinese laws and government decision-makings.
124) Article 137 of China-New Zealand FTA. The measures affecting services do not include 
subsidies provided by a Party or “laws, regulations, policies and procedures of general 
application governing the procurement by government agencies of goods and services 
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with 
a view to use in the production of goods or the supply of services for commercial 
sale.” See Article 137(5) of China-New Zealand FTA.
125) It is also provided that where the laws of either Party or international obligations existing 
at conclusion of the FTA or established thereafter between the Parties result in more 
favorable treatment to the investments of the investors from the other Party than that 
provided by the FTA, the more favorable treatment should apply. See Article 55 of 
China-Pakistan FTA. 
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(a) any other customs union, free trade zone, economic union and any international 
agreement resulting in such unions, or similar institutions; (b) any international 
agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to taxation; (c) any arrangements 
for facilitating small scale trade in border areas.” The China-New Zealand FTA 
has, however, adopted a much elaborated standards. In terms of national treatment, 
it stipulates the specific areas should include “management, conduct, operation, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, by the investors” to their investment and 
associated activities.126) It also makes like circumstances as the condition for 
affording national treatment.127) 
There are also restraints on the application of national treatment provisions.  
They include (1) the existing non-conforming measures, (2) continuation and amendments 
of non-conforming measures provided that such amendments do not increase the 
degree of non-conformity, and (3) a measure that would not fall into the national 
treatment obligations under an existing bilateral investment treaty that a Party has 
concluded.128) This having been stipulated, the Parties are under an obligation to 
remove the non-conforming measures progressively.129) 
China-New Zealand FTA also explicitly stipulates that dispute resolution procedures 
under other arrangements do not apply to investors of any party, nor any differential 
treatment to third countries “under any free trade agreement or multilateral international 
agreement”.130) Differential treatment involving fisheries and maritime matters 
under international agreements may also be considered as exceptions to the MFN 
126) Article 138 of China-New Zealand FTA. In both China-Pakistan FTA and BITs that 
China has entered into recently do not have such detailed provisions.
127) Id.
128) Article 141 of China-New Zealand FTA.
129) China-New Zealand FTA does not provide specifically what may constitute a non- 
conforming measure. It instead incorporates the provisions of the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures mutatis mutandis. See Article 141 of China-New 
Zealand FTA.
130) Article 139 of China-New Zealand FTA. This exclusion includes “agreements on the 
liberalization of trade in goods or services or investment, any measures taken as part 
of a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization between the parties 
to such agreements”.
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treatment.131) 
The China-New Zealand FTA puts fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security in the same paragraph which requires the Parties to accord the 
treatment “in accordance with commonly accepted rules of international law”.132) 
It further elaborates that fair and equitable treatment includes “the obligation to 
ensure that, having regard to general principles of law, investors are not denied 
justice or treated unfairly or in equitably in any legal or administrative proceeding 
affecting the investments of the investor”, whilst full protection and security 
“requires each Party to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary in the 
exercise of its authority to ensure the protection and security of the investment”.133) 
Under China-New Zealand FTA, fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security require the host government not to take any measures that may result 
in unreasonable or discriminatory treatment against the “management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment and disposal of the investments”. This is by far the most elaborated 
provision on the subject that China has committed itself. Yet, China-New Zealand 
FTA also stipulates that violation of other articles “does not establish that there 
has been a violation” of the article on fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security.134) This is so because fair and equitable treatment requirement is 
bond to have significant impact on the laws and legal systems of the host country. 
What is fair and equitable, without treaty obligations, would be the entire decision 
of administrative and judicial bodies. With the provisions of China-New Zealand 
FTA, China must ensure that its decision-making complies with internationally 
recognized practice in particular due process.
131) Article 139(5) of China-New Zealand FTA.
132) Article 143(1) of China-New Zealand FTA. This arrangement of wording is very 
different from other FTAs and BITs that China has entered into. Whether or not this 
will become the practice of China is worth observing.
133) Article 143(2) and (3) of China-New Zealand FTA.
134) As mentioned earlier, China-New Zealand FTA puts fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security in Article 143. In BITs that China signed recently and 
China-Pakistan FTA, fair and equitable treatment is provided in one article, while 
protection and security are in another. Also, instead of “full”, they both use the 
adjective “constant” before the words protection and security.
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On the transfer of funds in respect of making an investment, investment returns, 
payments arising from royalties, concessions, loan contracts, liquidation of investments, 
expropriation, restitution or compensation as a result of losses owing to war, 
armed conflict or a state of national emergency, insurrection or riot, etc., China-New 
Zealand FTA contains the common provisions of the China-German BIT and 
China-Pakistan FTA.135) In addition, China-New Zealand FTA provides: (1) detailed 
arrangements for exchange rates, (2) China may retain its foreign exchange control 
provided that MFN treatment obligation is observed and the measures are not excessively 
burdensome on the investors, (3) both Parties may restrain, on the basis of equity, 
non-discrimination and good faith and through laws, transfer relating to:
a. bankruptcy, insolvency, or protection of the rights of creditors;
b. issuing, trading or dealing in securities, futures or derivatives;
c. criminal or penal offences;
d. financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist 
law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities; or
e. ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative 
proceedings.136) 
What should also be noted is that Article 142 of China-New Zealand prohibits 
both parties from requiring their own nationals to transfer back their “income, 
earnings, profits or other amounts derived from or attributable to investments in the 
territory of the other Party” or penalize those who fail to transfer.137) China has currently 
such requirements. As a compromise, the FTA permits China not to be subject to the 
above provisions on condition that Chinese laws and regulations so provide.138)  
135) China-Pakistan FTA’s provisions on transfer are almost identical with those in 
China-German BIT.
136) Article 142(4) of China-New Zealand FTA.
137) Article 142(5) of China-New Zealand FTA.
138) The significance of this provision is that once China abandons the current transfer 
back requirement, it may not re-introduce such rules. See Article 142(7) of China-New 
Zealand FTA.
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It is debatable whether BITs and FTAs should allow investors from third parties 
(non-parties) to have a free ride and whether substantive business should be a 
precondition for such investors to be afforded protection. China-New Zealand FTA 
took the conservative or cautious position by stipulating substantive business 
operation as a condition for investors from a third party to enjoy the treaty 
protection.139) This also applies to situations where an investment is made by an 
enterprise owned or controlled by persons of a non-Party which has the legal 
person status of either Party to the FTA. This provision may in practice exclude 
the jurisdiction of ICSID.140) 
Applicable law relating to investment contract is of course as important as the 
requirement on the forum for dispute resolution. Chinese law requires all foreign 
direct investment contracts to be governed by Chinese law which should be regarded 
as covering both substantive law and conflict of law issues. This requirement may 
not affect the interpretation of BITs that China has entered into. Yet, once it 
comes to the issue as to whether a foreign investor or its investment has been 
treated properly, unless international law requires otherwise, Chinese law may 
have to be consulted. For instance, where a foreign investor wishes to import a 
machinery, the applicable customs duties will have to be ascertained according to 
Chinese law, based on which whether the foreign investor is treated fairly and 
equitably will be determined. This arrangement is in compliance with the ICSID 
Convention, Article 42(1) of which stipulates that tribunals must apply the laws 
and rules agreed upon by the parties and that “In the absence of such agreement, 
the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as 
may be applicable.”
139) Article 149 of China-New Zealand FTA.
140) Under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, where a juridical person has the 
nationality of a State, but because of foreign control, the State Parties may agree not 
to grant the same treatment to the judicial person as that other judicial persons of 
the same State are entitled to.
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IV. Expropriation and Compensation
Large scale or open expropriation is no longer a main threat to contemporary 
international investment. Indirect and creeping expropriation often triggers disputes 
however. As one of the host countries which have attracted largest foreign capital, 
China has always paid particular attention to the issue of expropriation but essentially 
limited to the traditional thinking. For instance, the China-Norway BIT stipulates 
for expropriation of foreign direct investments for public purpose.141) In addition, 
it requires the country carrying out the expropriation or nationalization to apply 
the principle of nondiscrimination.142) 
With regard to compensation for expropriation, the China-Norway BIT made 
some progress from the Chinese Joint Venture Law by providing:143) 
Compensation shall be made without undue delay and shall be realizable and 
freely transferable. It shall amount to the value of the investment immediately 
before the expropriation, and shall include interest until the date of payment.
This of course does not meet the requirements of the Hull Rule— host state is 
required to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation.144) Yet, considering 
the fact the Chinese law at that time was quite primitive and that China was the 
pure recipient of foreign capital,145) it was an important step in subjecting the 
country to international norms.
China-UK BIT brought China closer to the general practice of developed 
countries. Rather than recognizing the expropriation as a right of states, it prescribes 
“Investments … shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to measures 
141) Article 5(1) of the 1984 China-Norway BIT.
142) Article 5(1) of the 1984 China-Norway BIT.
143) Article 5(2) of the 1984 China-Norway BIT.
144) The Hull Rule was articulated in 1938 by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 
response to Mexican expropriation of U.S. agricultural and oil interests and became 
the cardinal principle of U.S. custom in this sphere. See M. Sonarajah, The International 
Law on Foreign Investment, 1994, pp. 229-230.
145) It was since 1979 that China started to invest abroad. Initially, most of its investments 
went to construction and catering. See http://www.chinapilot.net/Economy/01/05/article/114.htm.
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having effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization” except for a public 
purpose and against compensation.146) Expropriation or nationalization conditioned 
on public purpose and compensation was not a prevailing view among Chinese 
academics at that time.147) It was truly a significant move on the part of China.
The China-UK BIT still adopts the “reasonable compensation” standard in 
general terms. Yet, immediately thereafter, the reasonable standard is further stated 
as “Such compensation shall amount to the real value of the investment expropriated 
immediately before the expropriation or impending expropriation became public 
knowledge, shall include interest at the normal rate until the date of payment, 
shall be made without undue delay, be effectively realizable and be freely 
transferable.”148) It should be noted that the prevailing Chinese view on compensation 
for expropriation then was “reasonable compensation”. The wording of the China-UK 
BIT was obviously to adopt the Hull Rule in effect, whilst giving lip-service to 
the “reasonable compensation” in order to quiet potential internal criticisms.149) 
Actually the adoption of the standard in the BIT surprised a lot of Chinese and 
146) According to Chinese traditional view, the right to expropriation comes from the 
sovereignty of a state, any condition attached by the Western developed countries to 
legitimate expropriation is unjustified. However, Article 5 of the China-UK BIT seems 
to admit that China has given up the right to expropriate foreign investments unless 
the two conditions are met.
147) In 1980’s, by referring to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, right 
to expropriation or nationalization was recognized as an important aspect of sovereignty 
over natural resource. See Wang Tieya, International Law, Law Press, 1981, pp. 430-431; 
Prof. Yao Meizhen held that nationalization conditioned on public purpose and 
compensation was based on the capitalist doctrine of inviolability of private property 
which was totally unacceptable theoretically, as the right of nationalization was an 
attribute of sovereignty. For details, see Yao Meizhen, International Investment Law, 
Wuhan University Press, 1989, p. 379.    
148) Article 5(1).of the 1986 China-UK BIT.
149) In Chinese culture at that time, any major concession made to foreign countries may 
be considered as non-patriotic and deviation from the socialism, and would be 
subject to criticisms. This was more so in the mid 1980s, as there were hot debates 
as to what measures should be considered as reforms and what as adopting the 
techniques of capitalism. The debates ended with Deng Xiaoping’s tour in southern 
China when he stated that nothing was exclusively patented for capitalism. For discussions 
on this issue, see Guiguo Wang, Wang’s Business Law of China, surpra.
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foreign scholars as in other official documents China still refused to recognize the 
Hull Rule as acceptable standard.150) 
It is also stipulated in the China-UK BIT that “The national or company 
affected shall have a right, under the law of the Contracting Party making the 
expropriation to prompt review, by a judicial or other independent authority of 
that party, of his or its case and of the valuation of his or its investment in 
accordance with the principles set out in this paragraph.”151) Judicial review of 
administrative actions at that time was unheard of in the Chinese legal system.152) 
By granting foreign investors such right in case of expropriation amounted to 
inserting “judicial review” into the Chinese system.153) As international treaty 
provisions have the effect of filling the gap and prevailing over any conflicting 
provisions of Chinese law, this prescription serves as a tool to move international 
norms into the Chinese domestic law.154) 
A common feature of the BITs that China has entered into lately is making 
150) Article 5 of the Law on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises, supra. Also it should be 
noted that at that time China was the pure recipient of direct foreign investment. With 
its investment in foreign countries growing rapidly after the turn of the century, it is 
in China’s interest to ensure adequate compensation for expropriation.
151) Article 5(1) of the 1986 China-UK BIT.
152) In the Protocol on the Accession to the WTO, China agreed that there shall in all 
cases be an opportunity for an impartial and independent judicial body to review 
specified administrative actions. Under the current Chinese legal system, judicial review 
is only available to concrete administrative actions through the means of 
administrative litigation. By contrast, based on the doctrine of separation of power, 
under the common law, judicial review includes constitutional review of legislations. 
For discussions on judicial review in China, see Hu Jinguang, “The Space of 
Chinese Judicial Review”, Henan Social Science, Vol. 14, No. 5, (September 2006), 
pp. 72-76.
153) It was most probably the first time that a bilateral agreement had such important 
effect on the Chinese legal system.
154) A distinct feature of globalization is that international norms have direct effect on 
national legal systems. With China joining the World Trade Organization, international 
norms moving into the Chinese legal system, laws and law enforcement mechanisms 
has become a natural consequence of concluding international agreements. For discussion 
on the issue, see Guiguo Wang, “Globalizing the Rule of Law”, Indian Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2008, pp. 21-44.
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expropriation conditional. Nearly all of these BITs contain the following 
provisions:155) 
Neither Contracting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or take other similar 
measures against the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party in 
its territory, unless the measures taken meet the following conditions: (a) for the public 
interests: (b) under domestic legal procedure; (except for the 2003 China-Germany 
BIT); (c) without discrimination; and (d) against compensation.  
Regarding compensation for expropriation, the 2003 China-Germany BIT stipulates 
that “such compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment immediately 
before the expropriation is taken or the threatening expropriation has become 
publicly known, whichever is earlier.”156) In comparison, the 2006 China-Russia 
BIT, 2004 China-Finland BIT, the 2005 China-Spain BIT and the 2005 
China-Portugal BIT provide that the compensation “shall be equivalent to the fair 
market value of the expropriated investment at the time immediately before the 
expropriation was taken or the impending expropriation became public knowledge, 
whichever is earlier.”157) This slightly different version may not necessarily lead 
to arguments that the “value” under the 2003 China-Germany BIT is not “market 
value” of the investment in question, even though arbitration practice does not 
provide a definite answer.158) 
Without exception, all the above-mentioned BITs contain clauses that compensation 
must be paid without undue delay, including interest, effectively realizable and 
freely transferable.159)
 
These provisions are in essence a reflection of the Hull 
155) For example, Article 4 of 2005 China-Portugal BIT, Article 4 of the 2005 China-Spain 
BIT and Article 4 of the 2004 China-Finland BIT.
156) Article 4(2) of the 2004 China-Germany BIT.
157) Article 4(2) of the 2006 China-Russia BIT, Article 4(2) of the 2004 China-Finland BIT, 
Article 4(2) of the 2005 China-Spain BIT, and Article 4(2) of the 2005 China-Portugal 
BIT.
158) The issue relating to compensation is what it should include. For instance, in addition 
to the investment made, whether profits should be part of the market value and if 
“yes”, whether such profits should be ascertained after deduction of future cash 
flows or loss. In CME, Professor Brownlie obviously held a different view. See the 
Separate Opinion of Brownlie in CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic.
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Rule. These provisions of the recent Chinese BITs confirm that China has accepted 
the standard.160) None of these BITs however contain detailed rules on how the 
market value should be calculated, whether the Discounted Cash Flow Method 
(DCF) could be employed, whether the expected profits should be compensated, 
and what may constitute expected profits.161) Such issues will have to be dealt 
with by arbitral tribunals or the courts in practice. It will be interesting to observe 
how international investment arbitration and treaty practice may affect interpretation 
of these BITs with China.
All the recent BITs with China contain rules on indirect expropriation in the 
form “other legal measures having similar effect”,162) which is similar with that in 
159) Article 4(2) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT provides that “Such compensation shall 
be equivalent to the value of the investment immediately before the expropriation is 
taken or the threatening expropriation has become publicly known, whichever is earlier. 
The compensation shall be paid without delay and shall carry interest at the prevailing 
commercial rate until the time of payment; it shall be effectively realizable and 
freely transferable.” Similarly, Article 4(2) of the 2005 China-Portugal BIT states 
“The compensation shall be paid without delay; it shall be effectively realized and 
freely transferred.” Article 4(3) of the 2004 China-Finland BIT stipulates: “Compensation 
shall be fully realizable and shall, in order to be effective for the affected investor, 
be paid without delay. It shall include interest at a commercial rate established on a 
market basis for the currency of payment from the date of dispossession of the 
expropriated property until the date of actual payment.”
160) In comparison, the 1984 China-Finland BIT provided that “payment of compensation 
shall not be delayed without reasonable excuse”, indicating that it could be delayed 
where valid reasons existed. This was also true for the 1983 China-Germany BIT 
which provided that “payment of compensation shall not be delayed inappropriately”. 
There were no specific standards of compensation in the 1983 China-Germany BIT 
either.
161) It should be noted that in CME, Professor Brownlie was strongly against inclusion 
of uncertain and speculative future profits into market value. He also argued that 
when deciding the genuine value of an investment, the status of international law at 
the time when the BIT in question was entered into should be taken into account.  
Based on this theory, Professor Brownlie stated “The standard of appropriate or just 
compensation carries the strong implication that, in the case of a going concern and 
more generally, the compensation should be ‘subject to legitimate expectations and 
actual conditions’, as Schachter indicates. Schachter’s assessment coincides with the 
period in which the relevant treaty was concluded.” See Par. 32 of the Separate 
Opinion of Brownlie in CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic.
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the NAFTA Agreement.163) This however offers little help with regard to issues 
such as what specific measures may constitute indirect or creeping expropriation.  
As some commentators pointed out, “in any case, the wording of the existing 
investment treaties have failed to address the indirect expropriation problem, on 
the contrary, it brings forward this question, and assume that general international 
law can provide the answer.”164) The fact that the United States and Canada not 
long ago began to stipulate detailed rules in their BIT is seen as a response to 
such criticism and the situation that more and more disputes in international 
investment were related to indirect expropriation within the NAFTA framework.165) 
In the Protocol of China-India BIT signed in 2006, the criteria for indict 
expropriation were stipulated in detail with a balanced emphasis on results and 
purposes as follows:166)   
(1) A measure of expropriation includes, apart from direct expropriation or 
nationalization through formal transfer of title or outright seizure, a measure 
or series of measures taken intentionally by a Party to create a situation 
whereby the investment of an investor may be rendered substantially 
unproductive and incapable of yielding a return without a formal transfer of 
title or outright seizure.  
(2) The determination of whether a measure or a series of measures of a Party 
162) See for example, Article 4(2) of the 2003 China-Germany BIT, Article 4(1) of the 
China-Portugal BIT and Article 4(1) of the China-Finland BIT.
163) Article 1100(1) of NAFTA provides that “No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize 
or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take 
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”).”
164) Rudolf Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation: New Development?” New York University 
Environmental Law, Vol. 11, 2002, p. 79.
165) For example, Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, S. D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Pope 
& Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Methanex v. U.S.  
166) Article III (Ad Article 5) of the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of 
India and the People’s Republic of China on Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
III. Ad Article 5.
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in a specific situation, constitute measures as outlined in paragraph 1 above 
requires a case by case, fact based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
  (i) the economic impact of the measure or a series of measures, although the 
fact that a measure or series of measures by a Party has an adverse effect 
on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not 
establish that expropriation or nationalization, has occurred; 
  (ii) the extent to which the measures are discriminatory either in scope or in 
application with respect to a Party or an investor or an enterprise;
  (iii) the extent to which the measures or series of measures interfere with 
distinct, reasonable, investment-backed expectations;
  (iv) the character and intent of the measures or series of measures, whether 
they are for bona fide public interest purposes or not and whether there 
is a reasonable nexus between them and the intention to expropriate. 
(3) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted 
by a Contracting Party in pursuit of public interest, including measures 
pursuant to awards of general application rendered by judicial bodies, do not 
constitute indirect expropriation or nationalization.
In practice, a measure may include a law or regulation or decree or a final 
court judgment.167) In particular, the so-called creeping expropriation may involve a 
variety of actions or omissions by the government as a whole. This was eloquently 
stated by the International Court of Justice in Fisheries Jurisdiction case168) that 
“in its ordinary sense the word [measure] is wide enough to cover any act, step 
or proceeding, and imposes no particular limit on their material content or on the 
167) See The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 5 January 2001. The tribunal held that the “rule of 
judicial finality (often described as ‘substantive’) was thought to be directed to the 
responsibility of the State for judicial acts.” Ib., para. 68. The tribunal however 
distinguished judicial “affirmation of a general principle” from a specific order and 
considered only the former would constitute a measure. Id., para. 52.
168) Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgement of 
4 December 1998, I.C.J. Report 1998.
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aim pursued thereby.”169) 
The importance of treaty provisions on expropriation and compensation is that 
what action or omission may constitute expropriation would, via BIT, be decided 
by international arbitration tribunals in accordance with the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties170) rather than the domestic law of the contracting parties.171)  
 It is precisely in this sense, the treaty provisions have taken the power of 
interpretation away from the national courts.
The FTAs of which China is a party also consistently take the position that 
expropriation must meet the following conditions:172) 
a. for a public purpose;
b. in accordance with domestic laws;
c. being carried out in a non-discriminatory manner; and
d. on payment of compensation.
At the same time, China-New Zealand FTA provides that expropriation must not 
be contrary to any undertaking that the Party concerned has given.173) 
Like most other BITs, none of the Chinese BITs has defined the term 
“expropriation”. In practice, when deciding what may constitute an “expropriation”, 
arbitral tribunals sometimes take the following into account: 
a. There must be a taking by the host government or its agency of an investment 
169) Id., p. 432, para. 65.
170) International practice in particular the dispute resolution practice of the WTO shows 
that tribunals are very much prepared to interpret treaties, bilateral or multilateral, 
according to the Law of Treaties.
171) For standards of determining indirect expropriation, also see L. Yves Fortier, Stephen 
L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It 
When I See It, or Caveat Investors”, ICSID Review, 2004, Volume 19; Number 2, 
pp. 293-327.
172) Whilst both of them have adopted the four conditions, Article 49 of China-Pakistan 
FTA uses “domestic legal procedure” and Article 145 of China-New Zealand FTA 
chooses “applicable domestic law”.
173) Article 145 of China-New Zealand FTA.
China’s Practice in International Investment Law / Wang, Guiguo   233
by a covered investor, which may either be a failure to act or an omission 
of act by the host state; in most cases omission alone may not constitute a 
measure tantamount to expropriation;174) the investment expropriated may be 
in the form of intangible or tangible property.175) 
b. The taking must be substantial that has effectively deprived the investor of 
his economic use and enjoyment of the rights to the property or a distinctive 
part of such property, provided the taking is permanent in nature which usually 
involves a transfer of ownership from the investor to another person.176) 
c. The taking may be de jure or de facto and “direct” or “indirect”,177) and 
may be a single measure or a series of measures that the totality of which 
has the effect of expropriation (often referred to as creeping expropriation).
d. The taking is out of the investor’s reasonable “investment-backed-expectations”.178)
174) See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd session (2001), Article 2, 
available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm. 
175) Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 
11 October 2002, at 98, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Mondev-Final.pdf 
and also Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award, 3 August 2005, 
at p. 17, available at: http://ita.Jaw.uvic.ca/documents/MethanexFinalAward.pdf. 
176) According to the tribunal of Tippets case, “A deprivation or taking of property may 
occur under international law through interference by a state in the use of that property 
or the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to that property is not affected”. 
See Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 
Award No. 141-7-2, reprinted in 6 Iran-United States Cl. Trib. 219 (1984).
177) Whether a given measure is de jure or de facto is insignificant in judging its constitution 
of expropriation or taking of property. Indirect expropriation has also become a 
common phenomenon of BITs. This is illustrated by Article 1110(1) of the NAFTA 
that “No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate … or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation …”. In practice an indirect 
expropriation is interpreted as a measure that equivalent to expropriation or having 
the effect of expropriation. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 
Interim Award, 26 June 2000, at pp. 96 and 104, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
documents/Pope-InterimAward.pdf; also SD. Myers Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 
Partial Award, 13 November 2000, at pp. 285-286, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
documents/SDMevers-lstPartiaIAward.pdf; Marvin Roy Feldman Kappa v. United Mexican 
States, ICSlD Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002, at p. 100, available 
at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/feldman mexico-award-english.pdf. 
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In practice, expropriation may be compensable or non-compensable depending 
on the circumstance. It is observed that a regulatory action by public authorities 
of the host state is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under Article 
1110 of the NAFTA.179) When considering whether a regulatory action may be 
subject to legitimate complaint, other relevant factors must also be taken into 
account, such as the scope of the police powers, the purpose and effect of the 
measure, the proportionality of the measure between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realized,180) the bona fide nature of the measure,181) e.g., 
whether it involves discrimination.182) 
Fair market value as the standard for compensation is now totally acceptable to 
China, although the wording may differ from BIT to BIT and from FTA to FTA.183) 
In this respect, the China-New Zealand FTA contains detailed provisions on calculation 
178) The relevance of investor’s expectation to expropriation is that in some businesses, 
government intervention is expected, in which circumstance foreign investor concerned 
may not bring a legitimate complaint for expropriation as a result of intervention/regulation 
by the host government.
179) See SD. Myers Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Partial Award, 13 November 
2000, at p. 281, available at: http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SDMeyers-lstPartiaIAward.pdf.
180) See Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed SA. v. United Mexican States, ICSlD Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, at, p. 122 et seq., available at: http://ita.law. 
uvic.ca/documents/Tecnicas_001.pdf.
181) For discussions on the issue see Jack Coe, Jr., and Noah Rubins, “Regulatory 
Expropriation and the Teemed Case: Context and Contributions”, in Todd Weiler, 
Ed., International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, 
NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (2005) 597 at 632-643, 
and L. Yves Fortier and Stephen L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of 
International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor”, Vol. 19, 
No.2, ICSID Rev.-FILJ (2004) 293-327. 
182) Discrimination is always an important factor in disputes involving expropriation. In 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance case, the tribunal observed “If there is a “haircut” for 
holders of debentures, all should be shaven. Conversely, if one is allowed to escape 
the hands of the barber, the other should be allowed to escape as well.“ See 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional 
Facility), Para. 203.
183) For instance, China-Pakistan FTA (Article 49) requires compensation to be equivalent 
to the value of the expropriated investments immediately before the expropriation or 
the impending expropriation becomes public knowledge, whichever is earlier.
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of compensation by stating, for instance, that where “the fair market value is 
denominated in a freely usable currency”,184) the compensation must be ascertained 
in accordance with the “fair market value on the date of expropriation, plus 
interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that currency, accrued from the date 
of expropriation until the date of payment”.185) In case the fair market value is 
denominated in a non-freely usable currency, the compensation should be calculated 
at the prevailing market exchange rate for a freely usable currency on the date of 
payment.186)   
V. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Disputes settlement mechanism in China’s earlier BITs usually excluded the 
jurisdiction of ICSID. Even for those BITs where ICSID jurisdiction was 
permitted, disputes that could be subject to international arbitration were limited to 
the scope of expropriation and compensation,187) which practice has changed 
184) According to the International Monetary Fund, US dollars, Japanese yen, pond sterling 
and Euro are usable currencies. See Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of 
the IMF, Thirtieth Issue – Freely Usable Currencies, as updated as of June 30, 2006.
185) Article 145(3) of China-New Zealand FTA.
186) The same applies to interest payment but not apply to circumstances of compulsory 
license under the TRIPs of the WTO. See Article 145(4) and (5) of China-New 
Zealand FTA.
187) For example, Article 9(3) of the 1994 China-Iceland BIT states “If a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot be settled within six months 
after resort to negotiations as specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, it may be 
submitted at the request of either party to the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. Any dispute concerning 
other matters between an investor of either Contracting Party and the other Contracting 
Party may be submitted by mutual agreement to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply if the investor concerned has resorted to 
the procedure specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.” Article XII(2) of the 1988 
China-Australia BIT provides: “If the dispute has not been settled within three 
months from the date either party gave notice in writing to the other concerning the 
dispute, either party may take the following action: (a) in accordance with the law 
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dramatically in recent years. In 1998, China entered into a BIT with Barbados 
whereby disputes between a foreign investor and the host state are permitted first 
to be settled through friendly negotiation, and if no solution can be reached within 
a reasonable period of time, upon the investor’s discretion, they then may be 
submitted to the ICSID for arbitration.188) Similar provisions can be found in most 
recent BITs that China is a party. These BITs do not exclude the jurisdiction of 
ICSID in relation to important issues such as denial of benefits to the foreign 
investors with capital from the host country or controlled or owned by domestic 
entities of the host country, prudent financial supervisory measures adopted by the 
host country, and significant safety exceptions, etc.189)
 
Such changes in Chinese 
bilateral investment treaty practice have a lot to do with the fact that in recent 
years more and more Chinese entities began to invest overseas.190) China is no 
of the Contracting Party which has admitted the investment, initiate proceedings before 
its competent judicial or administrative bodies; and (b) where the parties agree or 
where the dispute relates to the amount of compensation payable under Article VIII, 
submit the dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex A 
of this Agreement. 
188) Article 8 of the Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of Barbados on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments. This Agreement was signed on July 20, 1998 and entered into force on 
October 1, 1999, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/abtgotprocatgobctearpoi1447/.
189) For example, Article 9 of the 2003 China-Germany BIT provides that “(1) Any 
dispute concerning investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of the 
other Contracting Party should as far as possible be settled amicably between the 
parties in dispute. (2) If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date 
when it has been raised by one of the parties in dispute, it shall, at the request of 
the investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted for arbitration. (3) The 
dispute shall be submitted for arbitration under the Convention of 18 March 1965 on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other State 
(ICSID), unless the parties in dispute agree on an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to be 
established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on the 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or other arbitration rule.” It should be noted 
that the 2004 US Model BIT excludes such items from ICSID’s jurisdiction.
190) China’s FDI outflows increased by 32% to $16 billion in 2006, and its outward FDI 
stock reached $73 billion, being the 6th largest in the developing world. Part of this 
overseas expansion involves considerable investment in other developing and transition 
economies. See UNCTAD, 2007 World Investment Report, p. 44.
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longer only the largest developing host country of foreign investments but also an 
important capital exporting state. For the purpose of protecting its own natural and 
legal persons investing overseas, it is necessary for China to accept the investor-state 
arbitration as a norm of international investment law.
China-Pakistan FTA and China-New Zealand FTA also provide for investor-state 
arbitration. Both FTAs make amicable settlement through negotiation as prerequisite 
for submission of a dispute to international arbitration, the period of which is six 
months.191) Thereafter, the investor concerned may decide to submit its dispute 
through other means. Under China-Pakistan FTA, the alternate means include 
submit the dispute to a competent domestic court of the host country and arbitration 
at ICSID; once a local court is chosen, it will exclude the possibility of submitting 
the same dispute to ICSID for arbitration.192) China-New Zealand also authorizes 
investors to submit disputes to ICSID for arbitration. At the same time, investors 
may make use of ICSID conciliation or UNCITRAL arbitration procedures.193)  
Before availing themselves of international arbitration, the three month advanced 
notice condition must be satisfied. The purpose of this provision is to afford the 
host country an opportunity to require the investor concerned to go through 
administrative review procedures which must already exist in the laws and 
regulations of the host country.194) The administrative review process in any event 
may not exceed three months. 
Host countries always welcome investors to submit their disputes to local courts, 
whilst investors in most cases prefer international arbitration. Under China-New 
Zealand FTA, an investor, having submitted its dispute to a local court of the host 
country, may later decide to resort to international arbitration provided that it has 
withdrawn its case from the domestic court before a final judgment is reached.195) 
191) See Article 152 and 153 of China-New Zealand FTA and Article 55(1) and (2) of 
China-Pakistan FTA.
192) Article 55(2) of China-Pakistan FTA.
193) Article 153(2) of China-New Zealand FTA.
194) Article 153(2) of China-New Zealand FTA.
195) Article 153(3) of China-New Zealand FTA.
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This arrangement is in contrast with that under China-Pakistan FTA.
China-New Zealand FTA also has detailed rules on arbitration procedures which 
have the effect of modifying the domestic laws of the Parties and those of ICSID.196) 
One of such modification is that the limitation period for submission of disputes 
must be within three years from “the time at which the disputing investor became 
aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of a breach of obligation” by the 
host country, which has caused loss or damage to the investor or its investments.197) 
Challenge of jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal and objection to arbitration on basis 
that the claim is without merit have become common tactic in international 
arbitration. According to the ICSID Convention, a pre-condition for ICSID’s jurisdiction 
is that the dispute in question must be legal in nature. “The jurisdiction of the 
Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, 
between a Contracting State … and a national of another Contracting State”.198) In 
practice what may constitute a legal dispute has been given a wide interpretation. 
In Saipem, Bangladesh argued that the existence of a legal dispute within the 
meaning of the above provision presupposed the “existence of a cause of action” 
and that as its dispute with the claimant was on an arbitral award issued by 
International Chamber of Commerce, it did not constitute a legal dispute.199)   
The tribunal however held a dispute over an arbitral award to have satisfied the 
requirement as “it involves a disagreement about legal rights or obligations.”200) 
196) Article 153(4) of China-New Zealand FTA clearly states that the provisions of the 
FTA on dispute settlement prevails over both ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration and 
conciliation procedures.
197) Article 154(1) of China-New Zealand FTA.
198) Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.
199) The BIT between Bangladesh and Italy defines “investment” as “any kind of property 
invested” including “credit for sums of money or any right for pledges or services 
having an economic value connected with investments” (Art 1(1)).
200) Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, 
issued on March 21, 2007, Para. 94. Obviously, the tribunal of Saipem was influenced 
by the Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank on the Convention, that 
where there exists a dispute involving the determination of the existence of legal rights 
or the scope thereof of a party, it is a legal dispute. See “Report of the Executive 
Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
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The underlining principle is that the “rights embodied in the ICC Award were not 
created by the Award, but arise out of the Contract. The ICC Award crystallized 
the parties’ rights and obligations under the original contract. It can thus be left 
open whether the Award itself qualifies as an investment, since the contract rights 
which are crystallized by the Award constitute an investment within Article 1 (1)(c) 
of the BIT”.201) Then what is the response of China to this issue?
The China-New Zealand FTA requires that a state party which wishes to raise 
objections to jurisdiction must file its submission no later than 30 days after the 
constitution of the tribunal.202) The tribunal must decide on the issue of objection 
first and must give the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their views and 
observations.203) With regard to interpretation of the FTA, the state party to a 
dispute may request the tribunal to seek joint interpretation by the Parties thereto. 
The joint interpretation which must be reached within 60 days has binding force 
on the tribunal. Where a joint interpretation is not reached, the tribunal should 
decide the issue on its own account.204) This looks like a balanced arrangement: 
on the one hand it requires the state party to disputes to take actions without delay 
and on the other hand the FTA Contracting Parties may give joint interpretations. 
It is always the Chinese position that those who have participated in the 
law-making should know best the meaning of the provisions thereof.
With government accountability in respect of arbitration growing, China-New 
Zealand FTA permits a state disputing party to make public all documents relating 
and Nationals of Other States”, World Bank, 18 March 1965, para. 26; available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partB-section05.htm#03.
201) Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, 
Para. 127. In the view of the tribunal, “the notion of investment pursuant to Article 
25 of the ICSID must be understood as covering all the elements of the operation, 
that is not only the ICC Arbitration, but also inter alia the Contract, the construction 
itself and the Retention Money.” Id., Para. 114. 
202) Article 154(2) of China-New Zealand FTA.
203) Article 154(3) of China-New Zealand FTA. When making a decision, the tribunal must 
consider whether either the claim or the objection was frivolous or manifestly without 
merit.
204) Article 155 of China-New Zealand FTA.
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to arbitration, except those specifically designated as confidential information when 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal.205) 
Award of the tribunal is final and may be in the form of (a) monetary damages 
plus interest or (b) restitution of property, in which case the state party may 
choose to pay monetary damages in lieu of restitution.206) Although costs and fees 
may be included in an award, no punitive damages may be awarded.207) Also a 
“disputing party may not seek enforcement of a final award until all applicable 
review procedures have been completed”.208) 
As discussed earlier, to accept jurisdiction of ICSID without reservation has 
become a standard practice of China. An important issue is whether foreign 
investors whose country’s BITs exclude ICSID jurisdiction or accepts the jurisdiction 
thereof but with reservations may bring their disputes with China to ICSID 
through operation of the MFN clause.209) Currently in all the BITs that China has 
entered into, there is a MFN clause ensuring “no less favorable” treatment than 
that to any third-party investors. Where an investor may, by invoking the MFN 
clause of a third-state agreement, be entitled to the right of bringing its dispute 
with the host country for arbitration at ICSID, there will be tremendous uncertainty.
China appears to have adopted a position on the abovementioned issue relating 
to operation of the MFN clause. The China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement is 
205) Article 157 of China-New Zealand FTA.
206) Article 158(1) of China-New Zealand FTA.
207) Article 158(3) of China-New Zealand FTA.
208) Article 158(5) of China-New Zealand FTA.
209) At the moment, international practice throws little light on the solution of the issue. 
Some countries have, apparently for the purpose of certainty, inserted explicit rules 
in their BITs on the application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement. For 
instance, the UK-Albania BIT entered into in 1994 provides that “for the avoidance 
of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) 
above (national and MFN treatment) shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 
11 of this Agreement (Article 8 is on dispute settlement)”. Similar provisions could 
also be found in the Annex to the 2004 Canada Model BIT, which stipulates that 
“Article 4 shall not apply to treatment accorded under all bilateral or multilateral 
international agreements in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement.”
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an example. Following a general stipulation on granting MFN treatment to 
“investors, investments and activities associated with such investments by investors 
of the other Party … in like circumstances … with respect to admission, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal”,210)  
Article 139 continues to provide:
For greater certainty, the obligation in this Article does not encompass a requirement 
to extend to investors of the other Party dispute resolution procedures other than 
those set out in this Chapter.211) 
In conclusion, over the last thirty years and more, China has emerged as an 
important player, both in terms of capital recipient and exporter, in international 
investment. Its legal system and treaty practices thereof are in the main trend of 
the international community.
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210) Article 139(1) of China-New Zealand FTA.
211) Ibid., Article 139(2).
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